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LABOR AND NATIONAL SECURITY;
AN ANALYSIS OF TRIPARTITISM AS EXEMPLIFIED
BY LABOR PROBLEMS AT U. S. MISSILE BASES

Thesis

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LABOR AND NATIONAL SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF

TRIPARTITISM AS EXEMPLIFIED BY LABOR

PROBLEMS AT U.S. MISSILE BASES

A Professional Paper

Submitted to the Faculty

Of the Graduate School of the University of Louisville

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Business Administration

School of Business

By

Lieutenant Charles T. Wells, U.S. Navy

Year

1963

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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA
LAW AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN RELATION TO
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
PRESENTED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA

A Symposium
Presented to the Faculty
of the Graduate School of the University of Louisiana
in Partial Fulfillment of the
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Master of Business Administration

School of Business
at
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1963

NAME OF STUDENT: LIEUTENANT CHARLES T. WELLS, U.S. NAVY

TITLE OF THESIS:

**LABOR AND NATIONAL SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF
TRIPARTITISM AS EXEMPLIFIED BY LABOR
PROBLEMS AT U.S. MISSILE BASES**

APPROVED BY THE READING COMMITTEE

COMPOSED OF THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS:

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WILL BE HEARD

TO BE HEARD ON: ALTHOUGH CHARGE T. WELLS, U.S. MARSHAL

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TO BE HEARD ON: ALTHOUGH CHARGE T. WELLS, U.S. MARSHAL

APPROVED BY THE READING COMMITTEE

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THE OPINIONS OR ASSERTIONS CONTAINED IN THIS STUDY ARE THE PERSONAL ONES OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS OFFICIAL OR AS REFLECTING THE VIEWS OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, THE NAVAL SERVICE, OR OF ANY FEDERAL AGENCY OR COMMISSION

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1918

THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL IS THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR ALL PERSONNEL OF THE ARMY AND FOR ALL MATTERS OF THE ARMY IN GENERAL. IT IS THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMY RECORDS, AND FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMY RECORDS OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL. IT IS THE OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMY RECORDS OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.

PREFACE

DISCUSSION

This study is an analysis of issues concerning Federal Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes, and an examination of the particular problem of labor strife at U. S. missile bases. The thesis set forth is that tripartite action in labor relations is indispensable due to the potentially serious, detrimental effects that labor disputes may have upon national security. This thesis is based on the premise that the interests of the general public take precedence over individual desires or choice of alternatives in labor-management relations.

Chapter I details the provenance of tripartite adjudication as related to national security, and clarifies the overall problem as one of determining the need for Government intervention in specific situations.

Chapter II provides an orientation to the United States missile program in order to illustrate the setting in which labor problems affecting national security may occur.

Chapter III focuses upon particular labor problems in the missile-site construction program, and develops through a discussion and analysis of the factual record, the acute nature of missile-site labor disputes seriously threatening

This study is an analysis of income measurement problems.
Government intervention as a policy option is examined,
and an examination of the government's role in labor
at U. S. firms is made. The chapter concludes that
government action is least justified in industries that
to the potential for growth, government action may be
disorder may have been national security. This chapter is
based on the premise that the interests of the general public
have precedence over individual interests in cases of
national security management relations.
Chapter I details the government's role in labor
action as related to national security, and Chapter II
overall problems as well as determining the need for government
intervention in specific situations.
Chapter II provides an introduction to the United States
labor program in order to illustrate the setting in which
labor problems affecting national security may occur.
Chapter III presents open questions labor problems in
the state's construction program, and develops through a
discussion and analysis of the current record, the need
nature of specific labor disputes seriously threatening

national security. Areas of conflict between Labor and Management are clarified. The question is posed as to how these threats to national security could best be removed. Government action is deemed appropriate.

Chapter IV explores the general issue surrounding Federal Government intervention. This involves an inter-relation of factors affecting both private and public interests, and the reaction of Labor, Management, and public authorities to alternative policies whereby the ideals of free enterprise society might be preserved.

Chapter V analyzes the form of resolution chosen by the Federal Government in order that missile-site labor disputes not threaten further the health and safety of the nation. Tripartitism in the ameliorative techniques employed by the Missile Sites Labor Commission is proven to be an effective means of attending to labor troubles at missile bases. Consequently, as a result of extensive tripartite action, threats to national security are removed.

It is concluded that Federal Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes should reflect, in instances where threats to national security are imposed by irresponsible actions of Labor and Management, similar processes of tripartite action.

national security. Areas of conflict between labor and

management are clarified. The question is posed as to how

these interests of national security could best be viewed.

Government action is deemed appropriate.

Chapter IV explores the general issues surrounding

Federal Government intervention. This involves an inter-

relation of labor relations with private and public interests,

and the interests of labor, management, and public authorities

to alternative policies whereby the interests of labor are protected

and society might be preserved.

Chapter V analyzes the form of legislation chosen by

the Federal Government in order that similar labor disputes

not threaten further the health and safety of the nation.

Tripartite in the legislative recognition enjoyed by the

National Labor Relations Board is shown to be an effective

means of attaining to labor tranquility in similar cases. Con-

sequently, as a result of extensive legislative action, tranquility

in national security are assured.

It is concluded that Federal Government intervention as

a third-party to labor disputes should reflect, in instances

where threats to national security are imposed by irresponsible

actions of labor and management, similar processes of tripartite

action.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTAINER	111
PREFACE	iv
LIST OF TABLES	vii
LIST OF CHARTS	viii

Chapter

I. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LABOR PROBLEMS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY	1
Introduction	
World War I Labor Disputes and Adjustment Agencies	
World War II Labor Disputes and Functions of the National War Labor Board	
Labor Problems and National Defense Since 1945	
Summary	
II. THE UNITED STATES MISSILE PROGRAM	28
Introduction	
The Advent of Ballistic Missiles and a United States Missile Program	
Administrative Pattern	
The Dependency of the Missile Program on Construction Support	
Summary	
III. A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL CONCERN: LABOR DISPUTES AT MISSILE BASES	44
Introduction	
Construction Labor Problems	
Man-days of Labor Lost	
Comparison of Missile Sites Labor Statistics with All Industry and Contract Construction	
Summary	

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

1. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LABOR POLICIES ADOPTED
NATIONAL SOCIETY

Country
1947
Labor Problems and National Defense
at the National War Labor Board
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Defense
Title was I Labor Disputes and National
Defense

11. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF DALLAS, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL AS THE SAME APPEARS IN THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF SAID COUNTY.

The Department of the Interior
 Bureau of Land Management
 Washington, D. C. 20246
 Attention: Chief of Bureau
 Date: 10/1/68
 To: Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Washington, D. C. 20535
 Subject: [REDACTED]

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DATE 08-11-2010 BY 60322 UCBAW

with all industry and consumer organizations
Cooperation of Alaska State Labor Relations
Department at labor law
Construction Labor Problems
Investigation

IV. THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AS A THIRD-PARTY TO LABOR DISPUTES	65
--	----

Introduction
Government and the Public Interest
Alternatives
National Labor Policy
President's Advisory Committee on
Labor-Management Policy
Views on Government's Role
Summary

V. THE MISSILE SITES LABOR COMMISSION	81
---	----

Introduction
Establishment
Adjustment Machinery
Policies
Rulings and Decisions
The Record of Labor Disputes Since Estab-
lishment of the Commission
Summary

VI. CONCLUSION	107
--------------------------	-----

BIBLIOGRAPHY	113
------------------------	-----

IV. THE LIMIT OF FORMAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION	55
A. THE LIMIT TO FORMAL INTERVENTION	

Introduction	
Government and the Public Interest	
Allocation	
National Labor Policy	
President's Advisory Commission on	
Labor-Management Policy	
Views on Government's Role	
Summary	

V. THE NINE-STATE SITE LABOR COMMISSION	61
---	----

Introduction	
Establishment	
Labor-Management Machinery	
Policy	
Outlets and Facilities	
The Record of Labor Disputes Since 1930	
Conclusion of the Commission	
Summary	

VI. CONCLUSION	105
----------------	-----

APPENDIX	121
----------	-----

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Comparison of Man-days Worked and Man-days Lost at U.S. Missile Bases, July 1956 Through May 1961	59
2. Comparison of Lost Time at Missile Sites With Contract Construction and All Industry July 1956-May 1961	61
3. Work Stoppage By Months on Missile Sites June 1961-May 1962	95
4. Work Days Lost During Work Stoppages at Missile Sites: June 1961-May 1962 . . .	96
5. Incidence of Work Stoppages and Man-days Lost at Missile Sites According to Type of Dispute: June 1961-May 1962 . . .	97
6. Incidence of Work Stoppages and Man-days Lost at Missile Sites by Type of Grievance: June 1961-May 1962	99

LIST OF TABLES

Page	Table
57	1. Comparison of one-day, two-day and three-day losses at Old Millville levee, July 1954 through May 1955
61	2. Comparison of loss rates at Millville levee with various Government and AEC estimates July 1950-May 1955
62	3. Losses by location at Millville levee June 1951-May 1955
66	4. Losses by location during first 24 hours of Millville storm, June 1951-May 1955
67	5. Estimates of peak discharges and one-day losses at Millville levee according to type of structure, June 1951-May 1955
68	6. Estimates of peak discharges and one-day losses at Millville levee by type of structure, June 1951-May 1955

LIST OF CHARTS

Chart	Page
1. Department of Defense Guided Missile Management 1950-1959	39
2. Ratio of Man-Days Lost to Man-Days Worked at Missile Sites - July 1956 to June 1963	101
3. Comparative Lost Time Due to Labor Disputes - Missile Sites, Contract Construction in the United States, and All Industry in the United States	102

LIST OF CHARTS

Page	Chart
192	1. Movement of German U-boats in the Atlantic Ocean, 1940-1945
193	2. Movement of German U-boats in the Atlantic Ocean, 1940-1945
194	3. Movement of German U-boats in the Atlantic Ocean, 1940-1945
195	4. Movement of German U-boats in the Atlantic Ocean, 1940-1945

CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LABOR PROBLEMS
AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LINGUISTICS

DEFINITION OF LINGUISTICS

Introduction

This chapter discusses the history of defense industry labor problems in three phases: (1) World War I labor disputes and adjustment agencies; (2) World War II labor disputes and functions of the National War Labor Board; and (3) Labor problems affecting national defense since 1945.

This historical review serves two purposes. First, the discussion sets forth background information regarding the effect that labor dispute problems have had upon defense industrial production. These problems have occurred during wartime periods and under cold-war peacetime conditions. Labor problems affecting national defense industries are thus not a recent phenomena. This country has wrestled with the problem for some time. In the abstract, the setting is complicated. It involves analyses regarding social aspects, politics, law, public opinion, and economics as well as factors of necessity relating to national survival; also involved is the perpetuation of American tradition as expressed in the concepts of Freedom, Liberty, and Individual Worthiness. The nation desires to preserve these concepts and further them in the interests of an international community of free peoples. In order that this goal may be attained it is imperative that

Introduction

This report discusses the history of defense industry labor problems in three phases: (1) World War I labor disputes and adjustment measures; (2) World War II labor disputes and functions of the National War Labor Board; and (3) labor problems affecting national defense since 1945.

This historical review serves two purposes. First, the discussion sets forth background information regarding the effect that labor dispute problems have had upon defense industrial production. These problems have occurred during various periods and under different economic conditions.

Second, the review identifies national defense industries and labor problems affecting national defense industries and their adjustment measures. This country has wrestled with the problem for some time. In the abstract, the solution is complicated. It involves analyses regarding social aspects, politics, law, public opinion, and economics as well as labor relations. It necessarily relating to national security; also involved in the perpetuation of American tradition as expressed in the concepts of freedom, liberty, and individualism. The nation desires to preserve these concepts and further them in the interests of an international community of free peoples.

In order that this goal may be attained it is imperative that

the United States be strong militarily. Military power can be sustained only on a strong industrial and economic base. The U. S. economy thrives on increased industrial production and additional potential for further increases. Improvements in technology and in human relations provide support for a growing, strengthened economy. Technological improvements have provided immeasurable benefits for our society. New scientific discoveries and technological developments have enabled the establishment of an immediate industrial potential in the United States that is the strongest in the history of the world. The record of coordination in human activity achieved in the United States, making possible the activation of industrial potential as expressed in the employment of men, machines, materials, and money, is one of great achievement.

However, as a practical matter aside from the abstract, there are problems of operation, of organization, of direction, of coordination, and of technique in the activity of employing human resources to achieve economic and industrial means. Specifically, this involves alleged conflicts of interest among three areas of society: Labor, Management, and the Federal Government with its responsibility for action in the public interest. The Federal Government is assumed to encompass Labor and Management within its framework of protection built up in the interests of society. Thus, a historical review of

the United States be strong ally. Military power can
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The U. S. economy, like all advanced industrial countries,
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have provided immeasurable benefits for our society. New
scientific discoveries and technological developments have
enabled the establishment of an immediate industrial potential
in the United States that is the strongest in the history of
the world. The record of innovation in human activity
achieved in the United States, making possible the creation
of industrial potential as expressed in the expansion of our
science, scientific, and many, is one of great achievement.
However, as a practical matter arise from the present,
there are problems of operation, of organization, of allocation
of coordination, and of technology in the activity of employing
human resources to achieve economic and industrial needs.
Specifically, this involves a broad conflict of interest
among three basic groups: labor, management, and the
Federal Government with its responsibility for action in the
public interest. The Federal Government is asked to mediate
labor and management within the framework of protection built
up in the interests of society. Thus, a historical system of

labor problems in defense industries punctuates the problem of aligning national public interests with those of Labor and Management.

The second purpose of this historical review is to show clearly that Federal Government intervention in labor disputes is nothing new. Government intervention has occurred in this modern age as early as the World War I period. In this respect, it should be understood that different criteria for Government action exist in time of war than during peacetime. In wartime, successful prosecution of the war is the main standard for action. In peacetime, some clarification is in order as to what constitutes critical industrial activity vital to national defense. Generally the Federal Government has intervened in defense industry labor disputes only when it considered that inaction would have caused more harm to the country's defense posture than the actions of intervention.

Specific labor problems affecting defense industries should be detailed in conjunction with the intervening efforts of the Federal Government in promoting the national welfare. It is intended that the ensuing discussion will convey an appreciation for certain factual information regarding defense industry labor problems and the record of Federal Government intervention.

labor problems in various industries throughout the country of
aligning national public interest with those of labor and
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is justified now. Government intervention has occurred in this
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it should be understood that historical evidence for Government
action exists as far as we can find. In certain
instances, Government of the past is the main evidence for
action. In particular, some legislation is in order as to
when Congress has passed certain industrial activity laws to national
defense. Generally the Federal Government has intervened in
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Specific labor problems affecting defense industries
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of the Federal Government to protect the national welfare.
It is intended that the present discussion will cover an
approximation for certain factual information regarding defense
industry labor problems and the record of Federal Government
intervention.

World War I Labor Disputes
and Adjustment Agencies

The World War I period was a significant one for the labor movement in the United States and for Federal Government participation in Labor-Management relations. Certain characteristics of this period are important in understanding the historical relationship between Labor, Management, and Government. Industrial unrest manifested in conflicts between unions and employers had developed during the few years previous to the War. In an authoritative account of the factors of unrest, Bing¹ details "the most important causes of strife" as comprising "inadequate wages, long hours, and opposition to collective bargaining and unionism." The Commission on Industrial Relations was established by the Federal Government to study labor relations in American Industry. On the whole, the Commission's report was favorable toward unionism. As a result, the United States Department of Labor was established "to study labor problems and represent the cause of wage-earners."² The Clayton Act was subsequently passed which seemed

¹Alexander M. Bing, Wartime Strikes and Their Settlement (New York: E. P. Dutton Company, 1921), p. 2.

²Carroll R. Daugherty, Labor Problems in American Industry (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941), p. 335.

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and management had developed during the two years preceding

the war. In an authoritative account of the history of

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the Committee's report was favorable toward unions. As a

result, the United States Department of Labor was established

"to study labor problems and represent the needs of labor."

Notes. 1. The Clayton Act was independently passed which would

¹ *Industrial Relations in America*, by the Committee on Industrial Relations, New York: E. P. Dutton Company, 1917, p. 1.

² *Industrial Relations in America*, by the Committee on Industrial Relations, New York: E. P. Dutton Company, 1917, p. 1.

to make certain union activities legal,³ exempting those activities from prosecution under the anti-trust laws.⁴

Labor's cause was advanced further in 1916 when Congress passed the Adamson Act. This Act "provided for the establishment of a legal eight-hour day for workers engaged in operating trains in interstate commerce and for the appointment of a presidential commission to study the results of the adoption of the eight-hour day."⁵

Organized labor at this time was the strongest it had ever been. It had won what was considered "official recognition of its role in the national economy."⁶

A variety of problems was encountered when the United States entered the World War. Stein and Davis⁷ review the characteristics of this period and detail the nature of industrial labor problems upon which attention was focused. In part, and significant for this study, it is appropriate to note certain of these characteristics:

³Ibid.

⁴Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (2d ed. rev.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1960), p. 224.

⁵Emanuel Stein and Jerome Davis (ed.), Labor Problems in America (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940), p. 190.

⁶Dulles, loc. cit.

⁷Stein and Davis, op. cit., pp. 188-209.

to make certain other activities legal, 5 necessary laws

enacted after presentation under the anti-trust law.⁶

There's action and movement toward in 1914 when Congress

passed the Sherman Act. This act "provided for the protection

and of a legal monopoly and for various aspects of operating

within its legislative committee and for the appointment of a

specialized commission to study the results of the adoption

of the anti-trust law.⁷

organized later at this time was the subject of the

new laws. It had been considered "national competition

of the type of the national economy."⁸

A variety of problems are mentioned when the United

States created the World War. When and later, under the

constitution of this period and later, the nature of

industrial laws (problems upon which attention was focused

in fact) and significant for this study, it is emphasized

to give credit to these characteristics.

⁶1914.

⁷Thomas M. Smith, *Law in America* (1914), p. 124.

⁸See also: Thomas M. Smith, *Law in America*, p. 124.

⁹Thomas M. Smith and James M. Smith, *Law in America* (1914), p. 124.

¹⁰Smith (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1914), p. 124.

¹¹1914, p. 124.

¹²Smith and Smith, *Law in America*, pp. 124-125.

The lack of organization in labor supply, its immobility, the necessity for adjustment to the demand for both skilled and unskilled workers in certain industries such as shipbuilding and munitions, the striking sectional and industrial variations in wages, the great increase in labor turnover, a decrease in labor efficiency, the tendency on the part of employers to ignore the legal safeguards for labor, the increase in labor unrest--these were only some of the many problems that had to be solved. When the United States entered the War, it lacked both an adequate, unified labor policy and a centralized, co-ordinated administrative machinery for dealing with labor problems.⁸

This focuses attention on the fact that prior to World War I, the Federal Government had no effective agency mechanism with which to aid the organization, coordination, and direction of labor-management relations. The war effort demanded that immediate action be taken in order that productive capacity could be expanded. This could be accomplished only if labor disputes in industries affecting national defense were resolved.

Federal control over private industry was exercised when President Wilson took over the operation of all railroads. Congress had authorized this ostensibly "to overcome difficulties growing out of conflicts of ownership and competitive aspirations of various systems;"⁹ however, a threatened general strike on

⁸Stein and Davis, loc. cit., p. 194.

⁹Merle Fainsod, Lincoln Gordon, and Joseph C. Palamontain, Jr., Government and the American Economy (3d ed.; New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1959), p. 267.

[illegible]

at various stages. However, a widespread feeling exists as to growth out of conflict of ownership and corporate responsibility. Congress has authorized this authority "to overcome situations President Wilson took over the operation of all railroads. Federal control over private industry was accepted and dispersed in industries affecting national defense were involved. This could be accomplished only if some immediate action be taken to order that production capacity of labor-management relations. The way must be found to aid with which to aid the organization, coordination, and division and I, the Federal Government had an advisory agency established. This document reflects on the fact that prior to World

U. S. Norton and Company, Inc., 1937, p. 287.
11. Government and the American Economy 1st ed., New York:
Charles Yarnall, Lincoln Center, New League C. Yellinowstein.

the railroads was the underlying problem. This helped set the stage for Federal Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes, which became an important, integral principle of dealing with labor problems affecting defense industries during the war.

Fifteen major Government agencies functioned to adjust labor disputes during World War I. Three important principles guided these adjustment agencies in their relations with Management and Labor.¹⁰ The avoidance of strikes and lockouts was the first and foremost consideration of these agencies. Although strikes did actually occur, no substantial harm to production of war materials resulted.

The second principle was "recognition of the right of workers to organize into unions and to be free from discriminatory practices against union membership."

The third principle provided for equal representation of Management and Labor on the various labor boards. The boards functioned mainly through the conduct of hearings and recommendations resulting from such hearings.

It is important to note the two agencies which headed Government activity in labor relations. First, the National War Labor Board operated as the "supreme court" in adjusting

¹⁰U. S. Senate, Strikes in Defense Industries. Senate Document No. 52, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, p. 166.

the following are the underlying principles. This belief and the
 hope (or future) Government intervention as a last-resort
 to labor disputes, which means an important, though not
 of itself, that labor disputes affecting business industries
 during the war.

First, major Government agencies themselves to assist
 labor disputes during World War I. These agencies themselves
 could cause significant agencies in their relations with
 business and labor. The agencies of labor and business
 was the first and foremost consideration of these agencies.
 Although agencies are actually active, no substantial work in
 production of war materials resulted.

The second principle was "voluntarism of the type of
 workers to agencies into action and to be free from Government
 agency functions against union membership."
 The third principle provided for equal representation of
 management and labor on the various labor boards. The fourth
 principle mainly through the control of strikes and Government
 action resulting from such boards.

It is important to note the two agencies which headed
 Government activity in labor relations. First, the National
 War Labor Board operated as the "supreme court" in settling

wartime labor controversies. Secondly, the War Labor Policies Board served as a "clearing house" for labor disputes. This board was not directly involved in adjustment action; it coordinated the activities of the other agencies.

The nature of labor disputes during the war may be clarified by examining the separate attitudes of employers and employees. Bing contrasts the attitudes of employer associations with the position taken generally by individual employers in dealing with their own employees.¹¹ When acting collectively, employers through their associations took rather liberal views regarding Labor. Management voiced good intentions to cooperate with employees and with the Government regarding labor policy. But the attitude actually taken by employers in administering labor relations programs was not liberal. Management unwillingness to deal with unions on a practical basis seriously hampered the administration of labor-management relations. As an example, Bing supplies the following accounts of employer non-cooperation:

Even with the war at its height the Lake Carriers' Association would not attend a meeting of the Shipping Board, at which employers from all over the country were present, because representatives of the Seamen's Union attended. The

¹¹Bing, op. cit., p. 225.

written labor contracts. Secondly, the War Labor Relations
 Board viewed as a "company union" the Labor Union. The
 Board was not directly involved in adjustment matters, it
 recommended the activities of the labor adjustment.
 The review of labor disputes during the war was in
 charged by examining the various activities of employers
 and employees, and assessing the activities of workers
 associations with the position taken generally by the Board
 employees in dealing with their own problems.¹ The Board
 collectively, employees through their associations could obtain
 Federal relief regarding labor. Management within Board
 functions in cooperation with employees and with the Government
 regarding labor policy. But the extreme necessity taken by
 employees in administration labor relations problems was not
 limited. Management willingness to deal with labor as a
 practical basis virtually required the administration of labor-
 management relations. As an example, Board requires the following
 manner of employer management:

When the war is in progress the labor
 contract, administration would be a matter
 of the shipping board, which employs the
 all over the country were present, workers were
 members of the board's labor union. The

reason for this refusal was the claim that to sit in the same room with union representatives would constitute recognition. In New York the boat owners would not accept the Government's plan of local adjustment agencies because this involved a board on which a representative of the Long-shoremen's Union would be a member; a special board had to be created with no representation of either employer or employee.

The Western Union Telegraph Company preferred to have the Government take over the wires rather than tolerate union membership among its employees, and this same position was taken by the Smith and Wesson Company¹²

The foregoing situations highlight the fact that employer cooperation was lacking in several instances and that Government intervention became necessary in order to promote the war effort.

The outstanding World War I case in which employer obstinance resulted in forceful action by the Federal Government was that of the Smith and Wesson Company controversy.¹³ This occurred at Springfield, Massachusetts during the summer of 1918. The issue revolved around the principle of collective bargaining. The facts were that the Springfield plant was manufacturing pistols for the War Department; the company had been operating for years with a closed non-union shop; the employees demanded that they be permitted to organize with the Machinists Union; the company refused to bargain and discharged various employees whom the company thought were active unionists.

¹²Ibid., p. 226.

¹³U. S. Senate, op. cit., p. 172.

[illegible]

The outstanding world war I case is John W. ...

[illegible]

Company refusal to bargain collectively resulted in a strike by about half the work force at the Springfield plant. The dispute was referred to the National War Labor Board which held in favor of the employees and ordered the company to accept the Board's decision, and as a result, the Federal Government "took over the company's plant under the commandeering power of the National Defense Act (Sec. 120)".¹⁵

Organized Labor, too, had to concede to the authority of the Federal Government. The outstanding case involved a series of strikes at Bridgeport, Connecticut, an important munitions manufacturing center during World War I. Bing states that the industrial strife at Bridgeport stemmed from "bad pre-war industrial relations."¹⁶ The main issue in the Bridgeport disputes concerned wages.¹⁷ Bridgeport machinists went out on strike in defiance of a decision rendered by the National War Labor Board. The strike ended when President Wilson "wrote the machinists threatening to draft them if they did not go back to work. This ended the strike."¹⁸

¹⁵U. S. Senate, loc. cit.

¹⁶Bing, op. cit., p. 73.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 73-81.

¹⁸U. S. Senate, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

Company's refusal to bargain collectively resulted in a strike
by about half the work force of the Springfield plant. The
dispute was referred to the National War Labor Board which
held in favor of the employees and ordered the company to
accept the Board's decision, and as a result, the Federal Gov-
ernment "took over the company's plant under the commandeering
power of the National Defense Act (Act 120)".¹⁵

Organized labor, too, had no success in the attempt to
the Federal Government. The contracting case involved a series
of actions in Bridgeport, Connecticut, an important machine
manufacturing center during World War I. Long before that
the industrial divide at Bridgeport stemmed from "bad pro-
industrial relations."¹⁶ The main reason in the Bridgeport
dispute concerned wages.¹⁷ Bridgeport mechanists went out on
strike in defiance of a decision rendered by the National War
Labor Board. The strike ended when President Wilson wrote
the mechanists threatening to draft them if they did not go
back to work. This ended the strike.¹⁸

¹⁵U. S. Senate, etc., 1915-17.
¹⁶U. S. Senate, etc., p. 17.
¹⁷Ibid., pp. 17-18.
¹⁸U. S. Senate, etc., pp. 17-18.

How did Management and Labor feel regarding Government labor administration? Among employers, opinion was divided. Employer feelings varied according to previous relations with employees, attitudes toward organized labor in general, and upon employer opinion as to whether a strike could be defeated. In general, Management evidenced a distrust toward Government labor administration, feeling that Labor was being favored by the Government for political reasons.¹⁹

Labor's attitudes toward Government intervention generally were cordial and favored Government action; although in some instances, as illustrated by the Bridgeport disputes, Labor believed that "the Government was catering to big business."²⁰

Two conclusions may be drawn from the actions of Government intervention and the attitudes of Management and Labor as have been detailed. First, Government action in the Smith and Wesson and Bridgeport cases served to make clear to Management and Labor alike that the Federal Government's power would definitely be wielded in order that effective conduct of the War could be pursued. Secondly, no clear understanding nor definition of proper relationships among Management, Labor, and Government was ever resolved to the satisfaction of Management and Labor.

¹⁹Bing, op. cit., pp. 231-232.

²⁰Ibid, p. 241.

... the all-embracing and labor itself regarding government
labor administration, heavy employer, union etc. divided.
Employer interests varied according to various interests and
employment, included could suggest labor is interest, and
upon employer again as to whether a strike will be declared.
In general, management welcomed a strike toward government
labor administration, feeling that labor was being favored by
the Government for political reasons.¹⁹

... Labor's attitude toward Government labor relations
was very cordial and favored Government action, although it
was sometimes, as illustrated by the following, superior.
Labor believed that "the Government are entitled to the business."
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and Government was ever resolved in the realization of manage-
ment and labor.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 121-122.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 121.

World War II Labor Disputes and Functions
of the National War Labor Board

The record of Labor-Management relations during World War II was one of co-operative effort on the part of employers, employees, and the Federal Government directed toward one common, all-important, and specific goal: that of providing sufficient industrial production to win the war. To this end there was unparalleled cooperation and national spirit in the all-out industrial effort. The labor dispute experiences and agency mechanisms of World War I had demonstrated that Government participation in labor dispute adjustments could be profitable for national interests. The foundation for wartime cooperation had been laid. Thus the overall labor experience during World War II was favorable for both Management and Labor as far as cooperative actions of the parties during wartime was concerned.

It is significant that World War II resulted in extremely rapid gains for Organized Labor. At the beginning of the war, Labor was concerned over union security, employee representation on government agencies, and the cost-of-living as manifested in the relationship between wages and prices.²¹ The

²¹See John H. Mariano, Wartime Labor Relations (New York: National Public and Labor Relations Service Bureau, 1944), Chapters I, II, and III. Also: Foster Rhea Dulles, op. cit., p. 232.

World War II Labor Disputes and Management
of the National Labor Relations Board

The record on labor-management relations during World

War II was one of co-operation efforts on the part of employers,
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effort, all-important, and especially goals that of providing war

essential industrial production to win the war. In this war

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all-out industrial effort. The labor dispute experience and
agency management of World War I had demonstrated that govern-

ment participation in labor dispute adjustment could be effective
for national interests. The foundation for wartime coop-
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Reason in the relationship between wages and prices.¹² The

¹² See John H. Williams, Wages and Labor Relations (New York:
National Labor Relations Board, 1944).
Gustave L. L., and L.L. Also: Wages and Labor, 1944, p. 117.

concern of Labor regarding worker representation on Government Labor adjustment boards was short-lived. The National War Labor Board was established on January 12, 1942 by Executive Order No. 9017 issued by President Roosevelt.²² This board was composed of four members from Industry, four from Labor, and four representing the Public.²³

Labor's concern over union security was ameliorated throughout the war. Early satisfaction was gained by Labor as a result of National War Labor Board functions. In the words of Foster Rhea Dulles:

The War Labor Board got off to a good start in 1942 when it found a solution to the issue of union security in the so-called maintenance of membership agreements. Neither a closed nor a union shop were to be enforced. Union members or those who joined a union, however, were required as part of any contract made in their behalf to remain union members for the life of the contract, and they were subject to discharge from their employment if at any time they failed to maintain good union standing. Management representatives on the War Labor Board protested this arrangement and were never to be wholly reconciled to it, but they at least passively acquiesced after provision had been made for an initial fifteen day escape period during which any employee could withdraw from a union wholly without prejudice. Once arrived at, the principal of maintenance of membership was to be

²²U. S. National War Labor Board, The Termination Report of the National War Labor Board, Vol. 1, p. 6.

²³Ibid., p. 3.

concern of labor regarding wages representation on Government
Labor adjustment board is was short-lived. The National War
Labor Board was established on January 12, 1918 by Executive
Order No. 1017 passed by President Woodrow Wilson. This board
was composed of four members from industry, four from labor,
and four representing the public.

Under the board's supervision over union activity was maintained
throughout the war. Early legislation was passed by labor
as a result of National War Labor Board formation. In the
words of Foster (1940):

The War Labor Board got off on a good start in
1918 when it found a solution to the labor of
union industry in the government's war effort. It
was a board of government. Under a board of
labor they were to be elected. This board
or board was joined a union, however, was not
called as part of any contract made in 1918.
In fact, to make union members for the life of
the contract, and they were subject to discharge
from their employment if at any time they failed
to maintain good union standing. Nevertheless
representatives on the War Labor Board provided
this arrangement and were never to be really
successful in it, but they at least positively
indicated that provision had been made for an
initial fifteen day escape period during which
any employee could withdraw from a union without
without prejudice. Once arrived at, the prin-
ciple of maintenance of membership was in

W. A. National War Labor Board, The International
of the National War Labor Board, Vol. 1, p. 1.

1918, p. 1.

consistently upheld throughout the war
 Nothing could have contributed more substantially to industrial peace than such assurance that union security and individual freedom of action would be alike safeguarded²⁴

The issue of wages and prices became a more difficult problem. The problem was characterized by government concern over inflationary trends, a need to maintain economic stability while at war, and the dissatisfaction of Labor with wage levels compared with the cost of living.²⁵ The National War Labor Board, however, formulated a wage stabilization policy which was considered by one Chairman as the Board's most outstanding achievement. This opinion was expressed by Dr. George W. Taylor who stated:

I will always consider that the formulation of the national wage stabilization policy was the Board's greatest achievement not only because of the difficulty of the problem but because the welfare of the nation was so dependent upon this action.²⁶

On the Management side, it was significant that organized Management declared publicly its approval of conciliation in labor disputes affecting defense industries.²⁷ This position

²⁴Dulles, op. cit., pp. 335-336.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶U. S. National War Labor Board, op.cit., p. XIX.

²⁷Twentieth Century Fund, Labor and National Defense (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1941), p. 123.

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... would have...
... to...
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action.²⁶

On the management side, it was recognized that organized
Management achieved parallel the approval of legislation in
labor relations affecting business industries.²⁷ This position

²⁶ Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ U. S. National War Labor Board, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

²⁹ *Investigative Committee Report, Joint U. S. National Labor Relations Board, National Labor Relations Board, 1917, p. 111.*
(New York: Government Printing Office, 1917, p. 111.)

is explained in part by Management's realization of the stature of Labor in the national economy. In World War I some employers had refused to recognize the principle of collective bargaining. By World War II, employers could no longer ignore union status and employee rights to organize. Management thus had no choice but to underwrite the process of adjustment in labor disputes as developed by the Federal Government.

The functions of the National War Labor Board revolved around the principle of "voluntarism," or cooperation among the civilian labor population, employers, and the Government--and around the principle of "tripartitism." Voluntarism reflected the intentions of all parties to substitute peaceful adjudication for strikes and was evidenced by the no-strike, no-lockout agreement of Labor and Management.

Tripartitism was primarily an assurance that all labor disputes would be resolved. Thus, there was no opportunity for some disputes to become non-arbitrable. The situation reflected the fundamental basis for Government intervention as providing a means whereby industrial production would continue at all times.²⁸

²⁸U. S. National War Labor Board, op. cit., pp. XV-XIX.

is explained in part by management's realization of the
 extent of labor in the national economy. In 1955, for
 example, employers had failed to recognize the extent of
 collective bargaining. By 1965, it, however, could be
 argued, labor union action and employer action of response.
 Management that did not realize how to administer the process
 of adjustment in labor disputes as developed by the Federal
 Government.

The formation of the National Labor Board involved
 around the principle of "voluntarism," as cooperation among
 the various labor population, employers, and the Government.
 and around the principle of "collectivism." Voluntarism
 collected the management of all parties to disputes involved
 adjustment for better and not achieved by the Government,
 no-labor agreement of labor and management.

Voluntarism was primarily an assumption that all labor
 disputes would be resolved. Thus, there was an opportunity
 for some disputes to become non-voluntaristic. The situation in-
 flamed the fundamental role of Government involvement as
 providing a union where industrial production would function
 as all times.¹²

¹²U. S. National War Labor Board, Vol. 1, pp. 13-14.

Recognition should be afforded the "peculiar circumstances" under which the National War Labor Board operated. Braun describes these circumstances in the following manner:

Its activities and policies rested upon the doctrine of the existence of a moral, if not a legal, obligation not to strike or lockout in wartime. No regular agency will, under ordinary circumstances, have the opportunity of functioning on such a basis. Moreover, the Board was a temporary short-term institution 'created because of the war and with no thought that it will last after the last shot is fired.' As part of the nation's war production machinery, it could count on more willingness of management and labor to cooperate than a peacetime agency functioning in an atmosphere in which the common purpose of winning a war does not exist. On the other hand, a temporary emergency board of such type cannot be expected to give too much thought to the pursuit or development of long-term policies designed to satisfy the needs of peacetime dispute settlement also. It neither has the time nor the function to do so. Its primary task in the field of dispute settlement is the preventing of interruptions of war production and, to attain this objective, it is perfectly justified to use all available means, including unorthodox ones which might not work under different conditions. Expediency might be given a greater role than might be advisable in the case of permanent agencies.²⁹

Braun's analysis highlights a point made previously in the Introduction to this chapter; different criteria for Government action exist in time of war than during peacetime. The actions of such a Board during wartime are accepted by Management, Labor, and the general public as a practical basis

²⁹Kurt Braun, Labor Disputes and Their Settlement (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 250.

for ensuring that wartime industrial production is not slowed, hampered, or otherwise affected by labor disputes. The general public realizes that the Federal Government must have operational administrative machinery during wartime to prevent harm to the industrial economy. In essence, the Government's "role in labor controversies is determined by the people who make up the government."³⁰ Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes thus becomes the generally accepted method of dealing with industrial human relations problems as conveyed by disputes between employers and employees.

Labor Problems and National Defense Since 1945

Previous discussion has detailed the significance that Government participation in Labor-Management relations held for the public interest during World War II. Two major products evolved from those wartime experiences. One was "the fundamental issue of voluntarism as a basis for public policy in labor disputes."³¹ In this respect, the war brought forth unprecedented cooperation between Management and Labor. This was exemplified by the full acceptance of collective

³⁰Milton L. Blum, Industrial Psychology and Its Social Foundations (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956) pp. 238-239.

³¹Orme W. Phelps, Introduction to Labor Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955), p. 349.

the country that entire industrial production is not shared
 properly, or otherwise adjusted by the Government. The gov-
 ernment realizes that the industrial development must be
 operational, administrative, technical, and financial in nature
 based on the industrial economy. In addition, the Government's
 "role in labor contracting is determined by the needs and
 state of the Government."²⁰ Government intervention is a
 three-party to labor disputes that prevent the generally ac-
 cepted method of dealing with industrial issues relating to
 laws as proposed by disputes between employers and employees.

Labor Disputes and Industrial Relations 1934-1935

Previous discussion has stressed the significance that
 Government participation in labor-management relations has
 for the public interest during World War II. The latter has
 been viewed from three various perspectives. One was "the
 fundamental issue of voluntarism . . . as a basis for public
 policy in labor disputes."²¹ In this respect, one may mention
 forth unhampered cooperation between management and labor.
 This was exemplified by the full acceptance of collective

²⁰ Wilson L. Shaw, Industrial Unrest and the Social
Foundation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932) pp. 112-113.

²¹ One S. Bailey, Introduction to Labor Disputes
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933) p. 148.

bargaining as an underlying principle of labor relations programs in American industries.

A further product of the war was tripartitism; the working relationship of the Federal Government in combination with Management and Labor--all seeking together to sustain stability in labor relations so that defense industrial production could proceed unharmed by labor disputes between employers and employees.

But what about the applicability of these concepts within the context of a postwar economy?

It is now intended to trace these concepts of voluntarism and tripartitism through the postwar years following World War II, and up to the year 1954 when the United States began a significant program of ballistic missile development.

First of all, the idea of voluntarism has permeated practically all concepts of industrial human relations programs since World War II. The development of personnel counseling programs, the recognition of industrial social psychology as a means of achieving higher industrial production goals and increased business profits, and the applicability of personnel programs encompassing employee dynamics and research programs all signify the recognition by Management that voluntary

designed to be satisfied through the use of the
 system in various instances.
 A further review of the system and especially the working
 relationship of the Federal Government is necessary.
 Management and labor-all working together to secure stability
 in labor relations as their common interest requires would
 proceed unhindered by labor disorganizing efforts and the
 system.
 But what about the responsibility of these workers within
 the context of a system economy?
 It is now necessary to state these workers as volunteers
 and specialists through the system to the following point
 that it, and up to the year 1918 when the United States began
 a significant program of military service development.
 First of all, the idea of volunteerism has been given
 clearly all concepts of industrial based volunteer programs
 since World War II. The development of personnel consisting
 programs, the recognition of industrial worker responsibility as
 a means of achieving higher industrial production goals and
 increased business profits, and the application of personnel
 program encompassing employee discipline and research program
 all signify the recognition by management that volunteerism

leadership in labor relations aids in achieving business goals.³²

That the spirit of voluntarism was preserved and utilized throughout the ten years following World War II is evidenced in the following statement of Professor Arthur Whitehill, Jr.:

Even more important than the actual programs, techniques, and devices in personnel administration and labor relations are the point of view and approach utilized in their administration. More and more business leaders are recognizing that in human relations lies the real key to progress in the years ahead.³³

What is meant by "point of view and approach" as contained in the above quotation? The question may be answered by considering voluntarism as inherent in any industrial human relations program. Voluntarism means cooperation. Cooperation is achieved through the efforts of employers and employees and reflects basic policies of voluntary cooperation. Cooperation between workers and employers has been sustained to a high degree; the two have achieved laudable progress in returning "to the traditional American attitude that all men are equal."³⁴ This idea of equality in labor relations is

³²An appreciation of this reasoning is contained in Roger Bellows, Psychology of Personnel in Business and Industry (3d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), *passim*.

³³Arthur M. Whitehill, Jr., Personnel Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955), p. 507.

³⁴William R. Spriegel, Industrial Management (5th ed.; New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1955), p. 461.

According to labor relations with the following features:

Page 11

There are signs of voluntarism and pressure and violence throughout the new labor relations with the following features:

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expressed in the recognition by Management that Labor occupies an unalterable position in the industrial economy--this concept finds expression in collective bargaining principles; when Labor is afforded recognition of its right to organize and represent employees, then Management is in essence saying "we recognize you and we will voluntarily cooperate with you in the interests of our business, our employees, and the public."

It may seem that this discussion of voluntarism has so far concentrated on Management's application of the concept. Although this has served as the medium through which voluntarism has been traced, it should be recognized that both Labor and the Federal Government have been involved in the labor relations activities of American industry. Voluntarism has been defined as cooperation among the civilian labor force, employers, and the Government. Cooperation has been achieved in the activities of all three, and a voluntary approach has identified the cooperative attitudes of all three.

Tripartitism has likewise been upheld and utilized in the administration of labor relations activities. The Federal Conciliation System is an example of tripartite action. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, established by the Taft-Hartley Act, reflects the enduring application of tripartitism in labor dispute adjustments. There are other

expressed in the recognition by management that labor controls
 an essential position in the industrial economy--this was
 not found anywhere in collective bargaining principles.
 When labor is accorded recognition of its right to organize
 and represent employees, then Government is in essence saying
 "we recognize you and we will voluntarily cooperate with you
 in the conduct of our business, our industry, and our
 public."

It may seem that this discussion of voluntarism has
 far oversteered the Government's application of the concept.
 Although this has served as the basis through which voluntarism
 has been tested, it should be recognized that such tests
 and the Federal Government have been involved in the labor
 relations activities of various industry. Voluntarism has
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Voluntarism has likewise been upheld and defined in
 the administration of labor relations activities. The Federal
 Government system is an example of cooperative action. The
 Federal Industrial and Commission Service, established by
 the Labor-Management Act, conducts the employer application of
 voluntarism in labor dispute adjustments. There are other

governmental Boards of this vein. It is considered unnecessary to trace the utilization of the various Boards; the important fact to note is that tripartitism has been actual through these recent times.

Tripartitism, however, has not endured without criticism. Its usefulness has been questioned repeatedly.³⁵ These criticisms have included charges of partisanship among Board memberships; the belief that tripartitism is not an appropriate device for developing long-term, continuous, responsible public policies; that impermanence of membership on tripartite boards does not lend well to perpetuation of basic policies.

It is considered that the above criticisms are secondary to the necessity for providing a means of resolution in all disputes. Without third-party participation by Government, Management and Labor could revert to positions of obstinance whereby non-agreements would result in strikes affecting adversely those U. S. defense industries directly and indirectly related within the industrial economy. Therefore, tripartitism is defended on the basis that it provides a proven method of resolving labor disputes to the benefit of society.

Beside the fact that the durability and utilization of voluntarism and tripartitism have been useful tools in

³⁵See Braun, op. cit., pp. 195-200.

administering labor relations activities since World War II, the postwar period was significant in another manner for labor problems concerning national defense industries. Following World War II the world was confronted with a Communist challenge directed toward world domination. The United States became the economic leader of the Free World's battle against Communism. The advent of the Cold War made increased industrial production necessary to sustain a Free World defense posture strong enough to combat the Communist menace. The requirements of national defense and foreign aid resulted in inflationary trends in the U. S. economy. This was evidenced by rising levels of prices and wages. Industrial production advanced by virtue of scientific, technological, and human relations progress by American businesses. Organized Labor, too, advanced in material degree to a position whereby it challenged Management to share business profits as never before.

Coupled with these facts, the United States Government became faced with some plaguing questions. When would intervention into labor disputes serve the best interests of society? When is intervention necessary in order to protect national interest? What industries affect national defense? Will democratic principles be best served through Government domination of labor dispute adjudicative machinery or should Management

[illegible]

and Labor be permitted complete freedom of action in the labor relations processes?

During the ten year period 1945-54, labor problems in defense industries posed no real threat to the national industrial economy as concerning military needs and requirements. It is true that there were periods of national emergency as during the Berlin Airlift and during the Korean Conflict. But through these periods there existed no general reaction of the American public, of national leaders on the public scene, of Management, or of Labor, to the effect that national security was seriously threatened in a grave and material sense. General belief was predicated on the premise that the United States was so far ahead of the rest of the world in scientific, technological, and industrial potential that the defeat of the Communist countries could be accomplished at will, anytime, and without undue hardship or sacrifice on the part of the American population. Within this general framework of public opinion, Labor enjoyed a protected position. Who could prove that Labor's demands were contrary to national interests? No one could. No demonstrable necessity could be clarified that would cause a public concern for Labor's increasing demands to share in business profits.

National defense was thus considered as unaffected by labor problems during this peacetime period. Although the

and labor is restricted complete freedom of action in the labor relations movement.

During the two year period 1949-50, James remained in

(1) because he considered military units and organizations
belonged together and he had to go to the national police

It is true that there is a large number of people who are not interested in the study of the history of the United States, but this does not mean that the study of the history of the United States is not important. The study of the history of the United States is important because it helps us to understand the present and to plan for the future.

But research also indicates that people who are not in the habit of reading the news are more likely to be misled by rumors and propaganda.

at the American College of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Illinois.

... of

Account for the following observations in a clear and concise manner.

of Barcelona as mentioned and see paragraph 1000.

James Douglas's 1916 film *Rescue Party*. Although the

country was never officially at war with the Communists, the recognition of a Cold War state in international relations resulted in a measure of concern over where to draw the line between industries affecting national defense and those not affecting the nation's military posture. The question was never resolved. Attempts were made in definitive arguments over national emergency strikes by Government, Management, and Labor. However, an integral part of the issue was always the appropriateness of Federal Government intervention at a given time.

Summary

This chapter has outlined the history of labor problems in defense industries in the light of wartime and peacetime experiences. One particular problem has been transfixed as overshadowing all others. This problem is one of determining the need and degree of Federal Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes.

Two conclusions are drawn from this historical review. The first is that wartime demands immediate, unqualified action by Government in getting a tripartite system of labor dispute adjudication underway. This requirement results from the state of national emergency as conveyed by the need for an uninterrupted flow of industrial production. Such production

country was never utilized as yet with the Government, the
 technology of a call has been in experimental relation to
 related in a system of labor only there is that the
 between themselves with the national system and some of
 following the nation's primary position. The nation was
 never reached. Although there was in the national system
 was national economy related to Government, technology, and
 labor. However, an integral part of the nation was always the
 approximation of Federal Government, technology is a
 given time.

ISSUES

This report has outlined the history of labor problems
 in relation to the nation in the light of social and economic
 experiments. The national system has been described as
 overlooking all others. This system is one of decentralizing
 the work and subject of Federal Government intervention as a
 third-party to labor disputes.

Two conclusions are drawn from this historical review.
 The first is that the nation's economy, technology, and
 by Government is facing a national system of labor disputes
 relationship economy. This relationship system is the
 state of national economy as controlled by the state for an
 undisturbed line of industrial production. That production

is required in order to meet military and economic needs of the country. Military needs are stressed because of materials required by the military services in waging war. Economic needs are considered as material requirements sustaining the general population in its support of the "war machine."

A second conclusion is that peacetime brings no end to the problem of determining the necessity for Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes. Just as definitions are required as to what constitutes industries affecting national defense in peacetime, so also must there be definition as to what constitutes peace. In the context of the Free World's battle against international Communism in general, and specifically in reference to the economic and industrial advances made by the Soviet Union since World War II, "peace" simply does not exist, nor has it been present since World War II ended. In this sense, the different criteria for determining governmental participation in the labor relations of employers and employees in times of war and peace may be less definite than was originally considered. The question is not amenable to specific analysis. The problem is complicated by other factors than the desires of Labor and of Management. The general public, too, has a stake in the matter.

is required in order to meet military and economic needs of the country. Military needs are provided through the mobilization of the military services in wartime. Economic needs are considered as material requirements existing for general population in the support of the "war machine."

A second conclusion is that economic activity in war is the problem of determining the necessity for government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes. Just as industries are required as to what commodities industries will produce and how many, so also must there be limitation on the amount of the time in the economy of the time.

World's War II against International Communism in general, and specifically in reference to the economic and industrial advances made by the Soviet Union since World War II, "boom" already that was not met, nor was it met present alone World War II ended. In this sense, the different economic for the continuing technological participation in the labor relations of employees and employers in times of war and peace may be less distinct than was originally conceived. The question is not economic in specific analysis. The problem is supply and demand factors from the perspective of labor and of management. The general public, too, has a stake in the matter.

Overall analysis should consider the public interest as the most important, significant, and foremost basis for decision. Before the nation can perpetuate public interests, freedom from destruction must be secured. The society must be preserved first, and the details of individual interests can be worked out later. Because of this overwhelming need for preservation, dominance in military power is required. In these modern times this conclusion is inescapable.

In the following chapters, a definite problem whereby individual interests conflict with those of American society is to be detailed and analyzed.

General analysis should consider the public interest as

the most important, efficient, and economical factor for

designing. Before the action and subsequent public interests,

freedom from restriction must be secured. The society must

be protected from, and the details of individual interests

can be turned over later. Because of this overlapping need

for protection, freedom in individual power is required. In

these modern times this conclusion is inevitable.

In the following chapters, a detailed review of the

individual interests will be given of each of the various

as to be detailed and analyzed.

CHAPTER II

THE UNITED STATES MISSILE PROGRAM

CHAPTER II

THE UNITED STATES MISSILE PROGRAM

Introduction

The previous chapter introduced the problem of Government intervention in labor matters and illustrated through historical experience the necessity for tripartite action in American labor relations. However, some definite mode of production must utilize human labor resources in order that labor dispute problems may require adjudication. In this respect, application of the previous chapter's analysis is to be made to the United States missile program.

This chapter will detail the advent of ballistic missiles and a United States missile program, the administrative pattern of missile program management, an appreciation for the magnitude of the operation, and the dependency of the missile program on construction support. This information will provide an orientation to the setting in which labor problems occur.

The Advent of Ballistic Missiles and a United States Missile Program

A nontechnical introduction to missiles is provided in an interesting book¹ written by a United States Air Force officer, Colonel Nels A. Parson, Jr., who is regarded as an

¹Nels A. Parson, Jr., Missiles and the Revolution in Warfare (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

Introduction

The present chapter introduces the problem of Government intervention in labor markets and illustrates through historical examples the necessity for legislative action in dealing

labor relations. However, some definite mode of procedure must utilize some labor resources in order that labor disputes should not require adjustment. In this respect, application of the previous chapter's analysis is to be made in the United States labor market.

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The Advent of Ballistic Missiles and a United States Missile Program

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¹Neil A. Parson, Jr., Missiles and the Revolution in Warfare (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).

authority on missile tactics and strategy. Colonel Parsons was a participant in Operation Paperclip, the program that brought Dr. Wernher von Braun and his colleagues to the U. S. from Germany after World War II. Colonel Parsons sketches briefly the record of missile development since man first attempted rocket experiments.

An ancient Chinese scholar and scientist named Wan Hu was perhaps the first person to try to propel himself into space. Chinese historians relate that Wan Hu fastened a cluster of crude rockets to a sedan chair and fired them all simultaneously. It still isn't known how successful Wan Hu was, for upon the rockets' blast, he disappeared and "has not been heard from since."²

Other accounts of rocket development show that during the 15th Century wars, use of rockets was made by the French against British forces. Germans experimented with war rockets up to one hundred pounds weight in the 17th Century. In 1806, the British bombarded Boulogne with rockets fired from boats.³

However, little significant development of missiles and rockets occurred until the 20th Century. Advances in

²Ibid., p. 17.

³Phillip De La Ferte, Rocket (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), pp. 14-15. Cited by Colonel Edgar R. Jackson, Jr., U. S. Air Force, An Analysis of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Base Construction Problem; Unpublished thesis, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1962.

emphasis on scientific basis and strategy. Colonial systems
was a development in operations. The program was
brought by. Whether you have the right to the U. S.
from Germany after World War II. Colonial systems
relates the concept of scientific development since the first
established modern experiment.

an ancient Chinese system had scientific method and the
was perhaps the first person to try to explain himself from
space. Chinese character system which was the first to show
let of which people to a system which was first class all
scientifically. It will not be successful and so
was, but upon the modern, which, he discovered and "how the
been based from since."

Other documents of the development show that during
the first century were, but as science was made of the world
against British interest. Systems represented with the world
up to the modern period which is the first century. In 1950,
the British colonial system with certain kind of power.
However, little significant development of scientific and
modern scientific method and the first century. However, in

² Ibid., p. 17.

³ Ibid., p. 17. (See also, Scientific Method
History, 1951, pp. 14-15. Cited by Colonel Roger E. Hansen,
U. S. Air Force, An Analysis of the Scientific Method
Modern Scientific Method, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951).
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1951.

scientific and technological knowledge aided the development of the airplane and aroused new interest in air and space travel. Significant advances in the development of missiles and rockets were achieved by Goddard⁴ in 1919, Oberth⁵ in 1923, and Saenger⁶ in 1933. These were accomplished respectively in the United States, Germany, and Austria.

During the period 1933-1939, the Germans developed a superior advantage in the development of guided missiles through an organized program of research and development.⁷ Although the rockets developed were crude compared to present day missile sophistication, the significant fact was that ballistic missiles became feasible as weapons of war. The subsequent development of the German V-2 rocket is well known. It was widely recognized that such a weapon, combined with the nuclear warheads developed and displayed by the United States, held vast potential for destruction. The Soviet Union, the United States, and other Allies competed in locating German rocket scientists and obtaining their services.

⁴Parson, op. cit., p. 19.

⁵Ibid., p. 20.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 22.

scientific and technological knowledge aided the development of the airplane and provided the impetus for its development. Significant advances in the development of missiles and rockets were achieved by Germany in 1939, Italy in 1942, and America in 1945. These were technological contributions by the United States, Germany, and Italy.

During the period 1933-1945, the German developed a superior advantage in the development of guided missiles through an organized program of research and development. Although the rockets developed were crude compared to present day missile sophistication, the significant fact was that ballistic missiles became feasible as weapons of war. The subsequent development of the German V-2 rocket is well known. It was widely recognized that such a weapon, combined with the nuclear warheads developed and designed by the United States, held great potential for destruction. The Soviet Union, the United States, and other allies competed in locating the men rocket scientists and obtaining their services.

^a Larson, Op. Cit., p. 12.

^b Ibid., p. 20.

^c Ibid.

^d Ibid., p. 22.

After World War II, the United States stepped up a program of missile development which had begun during the war but had received no urgent treatment.⁸ From 1945 through 1950, missile development activities were concentrated mainly at White Sands, New Mexico. The Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama was established in 1949. But during this period, the U. S. made the decision to rely upon aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons, and jet aircraft development took precedence over guided missiles. This decision gave the U. S. a superior strategic advantage that was destined to be seriously threatened by Soviet Russia a few years later.

The need for a program of ballistic missile development in the United States closely paralleled the state of the Cold War. Before Korean hostilities, there appeared little reason, at least as far as public opinion was concerned, to question the proposition that the Free World would champion the democratic spirit and American ideals. However, the Communists were at work to undermine the security of Free Peoples. An organized research program was evidently given priority in Soviet Russia to develop guided missiles. The Soviet intent must have been to achieve superior strategic advantage over the United States capability of delivering nuclear weapons by means of manned

⁸Ibid., p. 28.

After World War II, the United States stepped up its program of missile development which has begun during the war but had received no urgent impetus. From 1945 through 1950, missile development activities were concentrated mainly on White Scout, now obsolete. The Redstone missile is operational, although was introduced in 1953. Yet during this period, the U. S. made the decision to rely upon missiles to deliver nuclear weapons, and jet aircraft development took precedence over guided missiles. This decision gave the U. S. a superior strategic advantage that was destined to be seriously threatened by Soviet Russia a few years later.

The need for a program of ballistic missile development in the United States closely paralleled the state of the Cold War. Before Russian hostility, there appeared little reason of fear as far as public opinion was concerned, no question the proposition that the Iron Curtain would threaten the democratic spirit and American ideals. However, the Communist were at work to undermine the security of free people. An apparent Russian program was obviously given priority in Soviet Russia to develop guided missiles. The Soviet intent must have been to achieve superior strategic advantage over the United States capability of delivering nuclear weapons by means of manned

aircraft. The Korean Conflict pointed up the seriousness of Communism's intent to spread world-wide.

A change of attitude began to affect the American public. Concern over Russian technological advances led to increases in the United States missile budget.

From 1945 to 1950 the missile program in this country averaged about \$70 million a year, gradually creeping up to \$135 million by 1950. The first year of Korea saw \$800 million spent on missiles, and the second more than \$1 billion.⁹

Congressional records reveal that in 1953, control was centralized over missile programs of the U. S. armed services by the Secretary of Defense. This action, taken in the first year of a new Administration, served to channel missile activities into the regular planning structure of the Department of Defense. Such action resulted in the authorization on November 12, 1953 for the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy to fund and implement their respective guided-missile development programs. This was to be accomplished "within the framework of and consistent with established policies and procedures for interservice coordination, apportionment and control of funds and production scheduling."¹⁰

⁹Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁰U. S. House of Representatives, Organization and Management of Missile Programs. Eleventh Report by the Committee on Government Operations, House Report No. 1121, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., September 2, 1959, p. 10. Cited hereafter as U. S. House of Representatives, House Report No. 1121.

... a change in attitude seems to affect the way in which the

and the second was close \$1 million. Year of 1968 was \$200 million spent on minerals, averaged up to \$113 million by 1980. The latter country averaged about \$70 million a year, probably from 1965 to 1970 the mineral program in this

Control of funds for economic education.

12. A. Bureau of Representative, Government of Nigeria, Lagos, Nigeria, 1953, p. 10. Cited hereafter as N. R. 1953, p. 10. Cited hereafter as N. R. 1953, p. 10.

This reorganization may thus be considered as the real beginning of a coordinated program of ballistic missile development in the United States.

Administrative Pattern

Missiles are developed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy for tactical requirements, for air defense, and for strategic deterrence purposes.

Those missiles of most importance to this study are of two types. One is the long-range inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), designed to carry nuclear warheads over a 5,000 or 6,000 mile distance. The second is the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), designed for launching from forward land areas or from the seas to a distance of 1,500 to 2,000 miles. These are strategic missiles; they have received high national priority, are expensive to build, complicated, and evoke special organizations and procedures in development and production.¹¹

The ICBM is assigned exclusively to the Air Force for development, production, and deployment.¹² Three types of ICBM's have been most significant: Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman.

¹¹Ibid., p. 21.

¹²Ibid.

This organization may also be considered as the main
 element of a coordinated system of ballistic missile devel-
 opment in the United States.

Ballistic Missiles

Missiles are developed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy
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 ICBM have been developed: Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman.

11 Ibid., p. 11.

12 Ibid.

The IRBM has included three main types: Polaris, Thor, and Jupiter. The Navy has been assigned the Polaris for use at sea. The Air Force has developed and produced the Thor, and the Army the Jupiter. However, the Army has not been permitted to field the Jupiter. Deployment and use of the Thor and Jupiter has been limited to the Air Force.¹³

Overall missile management has thus been a three-sided military effort, with special management organizations utilized by each military service. Air Force missile management has been effected under the control of the Air Research and Development Command. The Army's work on the Jupiter missile has been the responsibility of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, Army Ordnance Missile Command at Huntsville, Alabama. The Navy Polaris management has been effected by a Special Projects Office of the Navy.

The urgent need for a streamlined, effective missile program was recognized early following concentration of missile development effort in the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In 1953, six additional Assistant Secretaries were created to aid the Secretary for Research and Development and for Applications Engineering. Although these two posts were

¹³Ibid.

The Navy has included these units (F-4, F-105, F-106, and Jupiter). The Navy has been assigned the F-4, F-105, and F-106. The Air Force has developed and produced the F-4, F-105, and F-106. However, the Navy has not been permitted to join the Jupiter. Deployment and use of the F-4 and Jupiter has been limited to the Air Force. 1)

Overall missile management has been a three-stage military effort, with special management organization utilized by each military service. Air Force missile management has been effected under the control of the Air Research and Development Command. The Navy's role in the Jupiter missile has been the responsibility of the Navy Ballistic Missile Agency, Navy Ordnance Missile Command at Huntsville, Alabama. The Navy Project management has been effected by a special Project Office of the Navy.

The missile need for a three-stage, efficient missile program was recognized early following development of missile development effort in the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In 1953, six additional selected countries were invited to join the Navy's for research and development and for application technology. Although these countries were

not specifically advertised as such, the main intention was that they should monitor missile development. In January 1954, the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development established the Research and Development Coordinating Committee on Guided Missiles. This committee's function was "for achieving a sound coordinated and integrated research and development program in the field of guided missiles."¹⁴

This administration pattern was continued the following year, when in 1955, the Gillette Committee reviewed then-existent administrative procedures and submitted recommendations for improvement.¹⁵ The Committee's report "laid the foundation for the Department of Defense administrative pattern in handling not only the ICBM and IRBM programs but new weapons such as the Nike-Zeuk anti-missile missile, which also have been accorded high priority."¹⁶

A primary concern of the Gillette Committee was the problem of industrial and military construction. On November 8, 1955, the Secretary of Defense made the following specific

¹⁴Department of Defense Directive 5128.15, dated January 6, 1954. U. S. House of Representatives, Organization and Management of Missile Programs. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., February 4-March 20, 1959, p. 730.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 639.

¹⁶U. S. House of Representatives, House Report No. 1121, p. 2.

and specifically mentioned in early 1950s. The main responsibility
 that they should exercise in this development. In January 1950,
 the Economic Committee for Europe and Development Committee
 of the Research and Development Committee (London) on
 Golden Standard, this committee's function was "to develop
 a sound economic and integrated research and development
 program in the field of gold standard."¹
 This administrative program was outlined in the following
 year, when in 1951, the Office Committee reviewed the
 extensive administrative procedures and selected economic
 data for improvement.² The Committee's report "also the
 foundation for the development of future administrative program
 in handling not only the 1950 and 1951 program but also program
 such as the 1952-53 and 1953-54 studies, which also have
 been completed since then."³

A primary concern of the Office Committee was the pro-
 cess of industrial and military cooperation. In November 1951,
 the Secretary of Defense made the following statement:

¹Report of the Economic Committee for Europe and Development Committee
 U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on International
 and Foreign Affairs, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the
 Committee on Government Operations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
 February 1-10, 1950, p. 120.

²Id., p. 120.

³U. S. House of Representatives, House Report No. 1111, p. 5

authorizations and general operating concepts regarding missile program construction:

The Secretary of the Air Force . . . and the joint Army-Navy Committee . . . were delegated authority to approve facilities requirements, establish completion dates, designate the agency for construction best able to meet the required objectives, and to approve the construction. Funds apportioned by the Bureau of the Budget were to be made available in lump sums as justified in the development plans and reflected in the financial plans as approved by the OSD Ballistic Missiles Committee. In the meantime the Secretary of the Air Force and the joint Army-Navy Committee were authorized to proceed immediately with their studies and with the design of facilities required to support their purposes.¹⁷

In chronological sequence then, the year 1955 marked another administrative change in the U. S. missile program that had been given priority during Korean hostilities and which had been significantly reorganized in 1953. The 1955 management organization was utilized until 1957. In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I into orbit. Immediate concern was demonstrated by the American public over the Russian accomplishment. U. S. missile programs were stepped up accordingly, and the military potential of space seemed unlimited.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 provided another means of speeding-up missile program decision-making processes

¹⁷Ibid., p. 28.

means of spending it itself program decision-making process

The defense organization set of 1958 program number

united.

Accordingly, and the military personnel of other units

also accomplished. U. S. missile program were aimed at

concern and demonstrated by the defense public were the

1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I into orbit. In 1957,

management organization was outlined until 1957. In 1957,

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also accomplished. U. S. missile program were aimed at

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1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I into orbit. In 1957,

management organization was outlined until 1957. In 1957,

which had been given priority during Soviet domination and

another administrative change in the U. S. missile program

program organization:

The hierarchy of the Air Force . . . and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . were directed

authority to approve facilities program, as-

critical facilities program, and the program for

construction was also to meet the required degree

of the program.

and the program.

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and the program.

and minimizing research and development duplication. This Act established the new post of Director of Defense Research and Engineering. This office was to take precedence over all other Department of Defense Assistant Secretaries. The duties of the new Director were "to act as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on scientific and technical matters; to supervise all research and engineering activities in the Department of Defense; to direct and control (including their assignment or reassignment) research and engineering activities that the Secretary deems to require centralized management."¹⁸

Chart No. 1 depicts the changes in the Department of Defense Guided Missile Management Program through the 1950's. Any conclusion forthcoming from analysis of these modifications must reflect the basic fact that at all times the organizational structure has been complicated and the overall program of great magnitude.

The goals of the United States missile program must necessarily be couched in general terms. It is understandable that specific information must be classified in the interests of national security. One the whole, it should be understood that the main goal is the development of a weapons capability

¹⁸Ibid., p. 18.

and maintaining research and development facilities. This Act established the new post of Director of Defense Research and Engineering. This office was to have jurisdiction over all other Department of Defense research activities. The duties of the new Director were to be as follows: to be the Secretary of Defense on scientific and technical matters; to report to the Secretary and coordinate with him in the Department of Defense; to assist and counsel (including their assignment to research) research and engineering activities; that the Secretary does to require continued management.

That the Secretary does to require continued management.

Defense research and development activities through the 1950's, the Department of Defense has been engaged in some major research and development activities. The Secretary of Defense must realize the fact that at all times the organizational structure has been complicated and the overall program has been complicated.

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necessarily be based on general terms. It is understood that specific information must be obtained in the course of national security. On the whole, it should be understood that the main goal is the development of a weapon capable

10-10-54

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDED MISSILE MANAGEMENT 1950-1959




CHART NO. 1

Source: U.S. Senate, Work Stoppage at Missile Bases.
Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gations of the Committee on Government Operations, p. 712.

enabling the U. S. to hold military superiority over the Soviet Union. In practical terms this is the main objective. As a matter of fact this is the primary concern. This is a standing goal that must be achieved through long-range plans of weapons development. Missiles are complicated. Their effectiveness and dependability depend upon scientific, technological, and human relations achievements. Scientific progress finds expression through basic and applied research. Technological development depends on the ability of man to utilize all known resources, including human labor, in achieving new means of accomplishing desired results. This reasoning may be appropriately applied to the U.S. missile program in the sense that effective administration depends on the ability of men to organize, deputize, and supervise within the context of labor relations programs.

The scope of such a labor program is enormous. The missile program is a complex operation. Missiles must be designed, manufactured, tested, transported to launching areas, housed, and serviced in order to be operational.

Assuming that a missile has gone through the manufacturing stage and is ready for use, what is the next big problem? The problem may be considered as one of getting the missile to a launching site and launching it. This brings construction

mission. The U. S. is fully military responsibility over the
 Soviet Union. In general terms this is the main objective.
 As a matter of fact this is the primary concern. That is
 a serious goal that must be achieved through intensive plans
 of weapons development. Russian are confident. Their
 effectiveness and dependability depend upon scientific, tech-
 nological, and human resources modernization. Scientific
 progress is the separation through basic and applied research.
 Technological development depends on the ability of man to
 utilize all human resources, including human labor, in order
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 Assuming that a missile was given through the command-
 ing staff and is ready for use, what is the next big problem?
 The problem may be considered as one of getting the missile
 to a launching site and launching it. This brings connection

labor efforts into focus, for before a missile can be stored and launched, site facilities must be available.

The Dependency of the Missile Program
on Construction Support

How seriously do construction labor problems affect the capability of the United States to attain effective missile capability? This question is significant in the sense that missile-site construction is a vital link in the chain of events leading to the operational utilization of ballistic missiles.

However, before labor problems are discussed, it may be appropriate to establish in clearer detail the dependency of ballistic missiles on construction support.

The airplane is dependent on an air base for housing, servicing, and runway facilities and is of no value unless these are provided. Similarly, the missile must have physical facilities to be of value. However, in the case of the airplane, an air base can be utilized for various types of aircraft. Allowable tolerances in the type, size, and shape of airfields are fairly liberal. For example, an air base constructed for use by a World War II heavy bomber could be

and furnished, also facilities may be available.

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approximately 10 minutes in length detail the significance of

The airplane is dependent on air base facilities for housing, servicing, and runway facilities and is of no value unless these are provided. Similarly, the atomic bomb and physical facilities to be of value. However, in the case of the airplane, an air base can be utilized for various types of aircraft. Atomic bomb plants in the type, size, and design of facilities are fairly limited. For example, an air base constructed for use as a World War II heavy bomber could be

adapted with relative ease for use by a modern heavy jet bomber such as the B-52.¹⁹

This concept of base and weapons-site adaptation has been changed though as applicable to ballistic missiles. Each missile varies as to the configuration of its launching site. These missiles are entirely new; they require new construction of site facilities. Missile-sites are complex and they are expensive; and missiles cannot be made operational without construction support.

Summary

Missiles and rockets have been experimented with for centuries but it was only during the current century that man developed these as effective weapons of war. Missile development paralleled the state of other technical and scientific discovery. The United States began a limited amount of work on missiles during World War II, but German efforts were the main achievements. After World War II, the U. S. missile program was not significant until the Soviet Union began to demonstrate proficiency in this area. As the Cold War progressed,

¹⁹Major General Augustus M. Minton, "Basing the Aerospace Force," Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. 12, Winter and Spring, 1960-61, p. 176. The dependency of the ballistic missile on construction support is clarified in graphic detail through photographs of missile launching sites and a comparison of Aircraft and Missile support requirements in Colonel Edgar R. Jackson, Jr., loc. cit.

extended into the future and the use of a modern device for the
work at the 1-2-3.

This method of data and information exchange has been
changed from an equivalent to a direct exchange. This
change is due to the fact that the exchange of data
has been made more efficient and that the exchange of data
is now more efficient. This is due to the fact that the
exchange of data is now more efficient and that the
exchange of data is now more efficient.

Summary

Research and development have been concentrated with the
construction of a new and improved system. This
new development is a direct result of the research and
development program. The United States began a limited amount of work
on atomic energy during World War II, but serious efforts were not
made until after World War II. The U. S. atomic
program was not significant until the Soviet Union began its
development program in the early 1950s. At the time the program

Major General Robert H. Brown, "Facing the Atomic
Future," U.S. Department of Defense, Vol. 12, 1954
Spring, 1954-55, p. 178. The development of the atomic
energy program is discussed in detail in the report
of the Atomic Energy Commission, "Atomic Energy
Development, 1945-1954," U.S. Department of Defense, Vol. 12, 1954
Spring, 1954-55, p. 178.

the U. S. stepped up its missile efforts and got a coordinated program underway in the early 1950's. In 1957, the first Russian Sputnik highlighted the need for a great U. S. effort to design and develop missile systems.

Missiles are of little value without physical site facilities. Therefore, construction support is mandatory. Missile-sites must be constructed through human efforts. It seems logical that labor dispute problems could be one manner by which delays, higher costs, and damage to the U. S. defense posture could be effected.

[illegible]

CHAPTER III

A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL CONCERN: LABOR DISPUTES AT U.S. MISSILE BASES

CHAPTER III

A STUDY OF NATIONAL CONCERN: LABOR

DISPUTE AT U.S. STEEL CASE

Introduction

Preceding chapters have reviewed in some detail the record of labor problems affecting national defense, introduced the issue of Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes, traced the development of the United States missile program, established the dependency of the program upon construction support, and pinpointed labor dispute problems as having potentially serious effect upon missile program goals and effectiveness.

This chapter will focus upon labor disputes in the missile program as occurred during the time period 1957 to 1961. More specifically, this period covers the time lapse between the launching of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union in October 1957, and April 1961 when a United States Senate investigating committee began a series of hearings probing labor problems at missile-sites. The investigating group was the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on the Committee of Government Operations, the chairman of which was, and has continued to be, Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas. The published record of these hearings¹ details a pattern of work stoppages, slow-downs, high wage-rates,

¹U. S. Senate, Work Stoppage at Missile Bases. Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the

Translating abstracts into English is more difficult than

record of labor problems existing in the industry.

dated the issue of Government Intervention as a third-party

to have been caused by the development of the [redacted] [redacted]

statis system, established the importance of the program

organs.com/education/education.html

problems in having voluntarily exiled from society

This chapter will focus on labor dynamics in the

Effect of position on measured weight during the test period 1997 in

1967 - was successfully completed since the new jacket

Received the manuscript of *Woolly* 1 by the Editor before he

October 1977, and April 1981 when a third season began.

Available online 30 August 2010

Table 1. *Continued*

was the following hypothesis: *Individuals with a history of*

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The published record of these meetings is available in a separate

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inter-union conflicts, and high expenses of construction that have remained unjustified by union, management, military, and public officials. Where the responsibility lies for these abuses has been a controversial subject ever since the McClellan Committee hearings spotlighted the crucial problem and the effects that labor problems were having on missile-site construction. National concern as reflected in public opinion and immediate communications media attention became a primary demand source for action to curb the detrimental time and money losses occurring in missile program construction. As soon as responsible governmental leadership realized the impact of these labor disputes, an immediate analysis resulted in executive action which turned the tide of abuse from increasing to decreasing proportions. Such action was the establishment of a Missile Sites Labor Commission by the President of the United States. An analysis of this Commission's activities is made in a subsequent chapter. The study, analysis, and research preceding the resultant progress was reflective of effort by all involved areas of Labor, Management, and Government to seek some method of resolution quickly and efficiently.

Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.; Part 1, April 25, 26, 27, 28 and Part 2, May 2,3,4,5 and June 9, 1961.

management, and high degree of responsibility. The
 have remained unaffected by union, management, military, and
 public officials. There are approximately 100,000
 workers who are a controversial subject over since the
 Civilian Control Councils established the special system
 and the workers that labor problems were having an impact on
 construction. Federal control is believed in public opinion
 and immediate construction while workers become a priority
 demand source for action to solve the construction time and
 money losses resulting in waste program construction. It
 soon as responsible government leadership resulted the
 part of labor labor disputes, an immediate analysis resulted
 in executive action which turned the tide of labor from
 creating to decreasing problems. Such action was the
 establishment of a National Labor Commission by the President
 of the United States. An analysis of this Commission's
 activities is made in a subsequent chapter. The study, analysis,
 and research presented and conducted progress was extensive
 of effort by all involved areas of labor, management, and Gov-
 ernment to seek some method of resolving fairly and efficiently

Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
 Sept. 1, April 23, 1961, 10, 11 and 12, 13, 14, 15 and
 June 8, 1961.

The parties to these proceedings comprised labor unions, contracting construction companies, military administrators, and other governmental agencies involved in the missile-site construction labor activity.

As these disputes are revealed, it is appropriate to bear in mind the general atmosphere enveloping the situation. The missile program is one method by which the United States upholds the security of the Free World. One purpose of sustaining a democratic society is to allow individual freedom of choice or selection of alternatives regarding dispensation of labor services and utilization of such by societal participants. The alignment of public interest commensurate with individual bargaining rights is reflective of dynamic processes of social or community adjustment to scientific, technological, and human relations progress. At all stages of the society's expansion or perpetuation, problems crop up regarding the organization, coordination, and technique of employing human labor resources. Labor disputes at U. S. missile-sites are illustrative of the form taken by many of these problems.

The parties to these proceedings appeared under various
constructing construction companies, military administration,
and other governmental agencies involved in the missile
construction labor activity.

As these disputes are resolved, it is expected to
be in line with the general atmosphere prevailing in the situation.
The missile program is one which is being carried out in the United States
which has security of the free world. One purpose of this
program is to allow individual freedom
of choice or selection of alternatives regarding disposition
of labor services and utilization of them by societal parties.
The alignment of public interest communities
with individual bargaining rights is reflective of demands
processes of social or community adjustment to technology,
technological, and human relations progress. At all stages
of the society's expansion or perpetuation, problems crop up
regarding the organization, coordination, and control of
employing human labor resources. Labor disputes as U. S.
missile-related are illustrative of the form taken by many of
these problems.

Construction Labor Problems

Following Sputnik I in October 1957, there was rapid action on the American scene in getting a more significant missile-site construction program underway at full speed. In early 1958, the Congress passed a supplemental construction authorization and appropriation bill, providing 112 million dollars to accelerate missile-site construction.² This was followed closely by increases in the number of planned missile sites.³ Commensurate with these increases the demand for construction workers multiplied at missile-sites. The urgency of getting construction work performed was evident. As many as 2,700 workers were employed at individual missile sites while construction work was being performed. In the overall program, about 30 different industrial and construction unions represented these workers.⁴

The process of construction at these bases reflected a "concurrent" approach in the development of missile weapons

²U. S. Congress, Supplemental Defense Appropriation Act of 1958, Public Law 322, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958.

³U. S. Congress, Military Construction Appropriations Act of 1959, Public Law 852, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958.

⁴U. S. Senate, op. cit., p. 7.

Construction of the Alaska Highway

Following Operation I in October 1957, there was rapid action on the Alaska case in securing a more significant military-economic construction program underway as well speed. In early 1958, the Congress passed a supplemental construction authorization and appropriation bill, providing \$1.5 billion dollars for economic Alaska-Alaska construction.² This was followed shortly by increases in the number of planned Alaska roads.³ Construction with these increases the second for construction program multiplied in Alaska-Alaska. The urgency of getting construction work performed was evident. As many as 1,100 workers were employed as individual Alaska Alaskan while construction work was being performed. In the overall program, about 30 different Federal and construction units represented Alaska workers.⁴

The project of construction of these roads reflected a "comprehensive" approach in the development of Alaska roads.

²U. S. Congress, Supplemental Federal Appropriations Act of 1958, Public Law 85, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1958.

³U. S. Congress, Alaska Construction Authorization Act of 1958, Public Law 85, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1958.

⁴U. S. Senate, HR. 111, p. 5.

systems. This approach was opposite the traditional step-by-step development of previous weapons whereby each program phase awaited the completion of previous phases. In the missile program, phases have continued to overlap one another. Missile-site construction began before the research and development phase of any particular missile type was completed.⁵ The significance of this fact is that changes in design, construction delays, and delays in research and development often resulted in missile installation and equipment checkout being performed at the same location and at the same time as construction work. This complicated the process. Various contractors were necessarily performing their varied operations in a complex array of construction work, equipment installation, and other related tasks, all performed more or less simultaneously.

Contractors operated under two types of contracts, fixed-price and cost reimbursement. Under the former, one fixed, predetermined price was paid for a particular job. Under the latter, or cost-reimbursement type, there was no certainty as to the ensuing cost; research and development being incomplete afforded no basis for cost determination. Thus under this type contract, a contractor executed an agreement to perform a job

⁵Ibid., p. 9.

[illegible]

for a certain profit and was then allowed to charge all expenses to the Government.⁶

When the cost-reimbursement type contract is considered in view of the tight schedules, necessity for work accomplishment, and uniqueness or lack of previous similar experience in such a costly, complex operation, it is evident that there existed opportunities for abuse in work efficiency and construction expense. Contractors in this situation could ignore the requirement of supervising costs in order to profit from their work.

As the missile-site construction program progressed, two basic reasons⁷ developed for expecting greater labor problems in this area than for other construction projects. These reasons are based on the situation as previously discussed. The first reason advanced is that of "joint occupancy." In this respect, employees of contractors for construction work were performing work at the site alongside the employees of weapons systems contractors performing equipment installation and related activity. Construction contractor employees were represented

⁶Ibid., p. 10.

⁷Ibid., p. 57.

for a certain period and not just allowed to change all at

once in the Government.⁶

When the non-involvement type document is considered

in view of the right objectives, especially for work satisfaction

and, and usefulness or lack of previous similar experience

in such a way, certain objectives, it is evident that there

related opportunities for some in work satisfaction and the

entire system. Therefore in this situation could there

the possibility of operating there in order to protect from

their own.

At the time the commission began its work, the

main reason for developing the operating system was to

be able to do the work satisfaction projects. This reason

was based on the situation as previously indicated. The first

reason advanced is that it "helps company". In this respect,

experience in management can be considered with more confidence

with all the advantages for experience in management.

Therefore, previous experience in management has helped in

many. Therefore, previous experience in management has helped in

⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

⁷ Ibid., p. 13.

by industrial unions. This situation often led to disputes between building tradesmen and industrial unionists over the matter of whether certain tasks were construction or non-construction in nature. Labor disputes of this type carry the term "jurisdictional disputes."

The second basic reason for expecting a higher level of labor disputes at these construction sites is manifested in the numerous contracts and contractors. Union representation means that collective bargaining agreements must be consummated between Labor and Management. The more complicated a project is in terms of numerous employers and unions, the more chance there is for problems to arise regarding organizational efforts and collective bargaining agreements.

There is other evidence that these were the primary reasons for missile-site labor troubles. One respectable magazine report has stated that the main causes were jurisdictional fights and the refusal of unionists to work with nonunion men.⁸

The Vice-President for Industrial Relations for the Martin-Marietta Corporation⁹ has described two reasons for

⁸"Why Missile Workers Strike," Business Week, No. 1728, October 13, 1962, p. 117.

⁹Douglas V. Dorman, cited in Labor Relations Reference Manual (Washington: Bureau of National Affairs), Vol. 49, p. 57. (Hereinafter cited LRRM).

of industrial unions. This situation also has to do with the
 between existing conditions and industrial unions over the
 matter of whether certain units were considered as non-
 constituted in nature. Some degree of this type of
 the term "industrial unions."

The second basic reason for requiring a higher level of
 labor relations in these conditions also is indicated in
 the various conditions and regulations. These regulations
 were then modified by the various units in order
 to meet the labor and management. The new regulations
 provided in the case of certain employees and unions. The
 new changes were in the process of being revised and
 industrial unions and collective bargaining agreements.

There is also a reason that these units are being
 reasons for these labor unions. The regulations
 require that the units be in the same way as the
 industrial unions and the unions of industrial in their
 manner was.

The Commission for Industrial Relations has the
 National Labor Relations Board has been the

¹ See "State of New York," Legislative Committee, No. 112,
 October 15, 1961, p. 117.

² See "State of New York," Legislative Committee, No. 112,
 October 15, 1961, p. 117.

the labor trouble. One conforms to previous discussion, being the unique situation of the missile-site construction program. The second reason advanced by this official is the interpretation of the Davis-Bacon Act. This Act

. . . establishes employment standards for laborers and mechanics engaged in public construction under federal contracts for amounts in excess of \$2,000. Such contracts, the Davis-Bacon Act requires must specify the minimum wages to be paid the various classes of mechanics and laborers employed on the project. These minimum rates are to be those determined by the Secretary of Labor to be prevailing for such jobs in the particular locality.¹⁰

This Act is considered only to guarantee a minimum wage to laborers and mechanics who work on federally-financed construction projects. However, the Act has been construed by some building trades unions as "a grant of jurisdiction over work performed at the missile bases."¹¹

The McClellan Committee hearings focused further attention on the Davis-Bacon Act. Testimony in these hearings revealed that the historical result of applying this Act to a construction project is that construction workers perform the work.¹² In this manner, the statute becomes involved in jurisdictional disputes between trade unions and industrial unions. This Act

¹⁰Labor Relations Expediter (Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, 1963, p. 252.

¹¹LRM, Vol. 49, p. 58.

¹²U. S. Senate, op. cit., p. 13.

the labor market. The evidence on previous findings, being the unique situation of the elasticities construction program. The second reason advanced by some writers is the lack of

action of the construction program. This has

... localities employed, according to laborers and construction engaged in public construction work. Federal contracts for services in excess of \$1,000,000. Such contracts, the Davis-Bacon Act requires that specify the minimum wages to be paid the workers engaged in construction and laborers employed on the project. These minimum wages are to be based on the basis of the lowest of labor to be employed. The law also in the past has been locally.

This law is restricted only to construction a minimum wage

on labor and materials and work on publicly-financed

construction projects. However, the law has been extended

by some judicial orders to a great of construction

work not performed at the elastic level.¹¹

The elastic level construction program is further extended

on the Davis-Bacon Act. Testimony in these hearings revealed

that the principal results of applying this law to a contract-

tion project is that construction workers receive the same.¹²

In this manner, the elastic program is extended to construction

disposal between these unions and industrial unions. This has

¹¹ Report on the Construction Program (Washington: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1961), p. 211.

¹² Report on the Construction Program (Washington: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1961), p. 211.

¹³ Report on the Construction Program (Washington: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1961), p. 211.

was enacted in 1931, during a time when unions were relatively weak and employers dominated labor relations programs. The Act appears to have been designed to protect workers from harsh practices of employers. The minimum wage established by the Act thus provided a measure of protection for the worker. Application of the Act, however, has been a continuing problem over the years.¹³ On April 25, 1961, the Secretary of Labor observed in a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force his growing concern of the problems arising from efforts to apply the Act at missile-sites.¹⁴ An example of the form this problem may take is shown in the construction of a missile silo excavation. The construction may take place 160 or 170 feet underground. The project involves a shaft-type, mining type, or subway type excavation. Engineers and others have not determined whether this should be classified as "heavy" construction, or "building" construction. The significance of the difference in the two terms is that the building rate of pay is often higher than the heavy wage rate. Thus, in the event that Davis-Bacon application is made as evidenced by the building rate, then the labor expenses of the construction project might increase substantially.¹⁵

¹³Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁴Cited in U. S. Senate, op. cit., p. 46.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 53.

was secured in 1931, during a time when unions were relatively weak and employers dominated labor relations programs. The act appears to have been designed to protect workers from harsh practices of employers. The minimum wage established by the act then provided a measure of protection for the workers. Application of the act, however, has been a continuing problem ever since.¹² In April 25, 1937, the Secretary of Labor answered in a letter to the Secretary of the U.S.A. Labor the growing concern of the problem relating to the effect on supply the act at this time.¹³ In January of the year this problem was taken in the construction of a machine with operation. The construction was then taken up or 170 feet underground. The project involved a well-type mine type, or many type operation. Engineers and others have not determined whether this should be classified as "heavy" construction, or "light" construction. The right-hand of the difference in the two cases is that the building rate of pay is often higher than the heavy wage rate. Thus, in the event that Davis-Kane application is made to establish by the building rate, then the labor agreement of the contract the project will become successful.¹⁴

¹²U.S.A. v. 27.

¹³U.S.A. v. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

¹⁴U.S.A. v. 27.

As the labor problems at the missile-sites are traced through the period 1957-1961, they appear to be evidenced primarily by the previously mentioned jurisdictional, union-nonunion, and wage-scale controversies. The labor troubles occurred mainly at 19 operational missile sites and at 3 test sites. Troubles were the worst at the test locations. These 3 test sites include Patrick Air Force Base (Cape Canaveral), Vandenberg Air Force Base, and Edwards Air Force Base. Problems at Cape Canaveral were by far the greatest.

Labor troubles took various forms. First, it may be appropriate to discuss wages and hours of work--traditionally disputable subjects. Problems arising from the administration of overtime are indicative of abuse to the missile program and to the U. S. taxpayer. In some cases, where construction deadlines required one type of workers such as electricians to perform overtime work, other unions such as carpenters or plumbers demanded the right to overtime likewise. In other cases, union employees working 12-hour shifts would begin their shifts at 12 o'clock noon and at 12 o'clock midnight. This gave the workers the opportunity to get four hours regular time and eight hours overtime due to work arrangements which stipulated a regular work day as beginning at 8 o'clock a.m. and ending at 4:00 p.m. This of course resulted in high

in the labor process of the mine-owners are treated through the period 1917-1921, they appear to be widespread primarily by the practically universal jurisdiction, union-connection, and wage-scale considerations. The labor troubles occurred mainly at 19 operational electric plants and at 5 less close. Troubles were the worst at the first location. These 3 cost lines include Pacific Air Force Base (large investment), Westenberg Air Force Base, and Roberts Air Force Base. These four Air Force Bases were in the first group.

Other troubles took various forms. First, it was in appearance to discuss wage and hours of work--especially dispositive matters. Problems arising from the administration of overtime are indicative of abuse to the electric program and to the U. S. taxpayer. In some cases, where consideration conditions required new type of workers such as electricians to perform overtime work, other outside such as carpenters or plumbers demanded the right to overtime likewise. In other cases, union employees working 12-hour shifts would begin their shifts at 11 o'clock noon and at 11 o'clock midnight. This gave the workers the opportunity to get four hours regular time and eight hours overtime due to work arrangements which stipulated a regular work day as beginning at 8 o'clock a.m. and ending at 4:30 p.m. This of course resulted in high

construction labor costs.¹⁶ Many of the overtime abuses were carried on until the McClellan Committee hearings publicized them. Through the 1957-1961 period though, military administrators and others bearing responsibility for the missile program attempted to decrease overtime expense. But all through the problem was permeated the issue regarding intervention into labor relations between employers and employees. Corrective action finally cut down on the overtime abuse.¹⁷

High wage costs were a resultant of not only the previously detailed overtime situation but were also a result of high wage scales and inefficiency. Officials of the U. S. General Accounting Office made spotchecks of payrolls at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral for the period 1958 to 1960. At Vandenberg, one contractor was revealed to have employed 52 plumbers and pipefitters, and 68 electricians. The plumbers and pipefitters, were paid wages averaging \$451 weekly, highest being \$733 and the lowest \$402. Electricians averaged \$510 weekly, highest being \$670 and lowest \$413. These figures were for a 50-hour week, reflecting 5 ten-hour days. At Cape Canaveral, the foreman of common laborers made \$434 a week. Iron workers

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 40-41.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 50.

consequently later cases.¹⁴ Many of the previous cases were
 carried on until the National Committee decided to
 them. Through the 1955-1961 period though, military agencies
 created and were dealing responsibility for the military pro-
 gram according to the same decision system. But all through

the program was continued the same regarding information
 into labor relations between employers and employees. There-
 fore military itself and how to run business there.¹⁵

High wage cases were a result of not only the previous
 is detailed system of payment but were also a result of 1945
 wage scales and incentives. Results of the U. S. Government
 Accounting Office with approval of payroll at Washington
 and the Government for the period 1955 to 1960. It determined
 was incorrect was revealed to have employed 21 persons and
 employees, and 60 employees. The persons and employees
 were paid wages ranging from \$100 weekly, highest being \$100
 the lowest \$400. Shortcomings averaged \$10 weekly. Highest
 being \$100 and lowest \$400. These figures were on a 10-hour
 week, reflecting a two-hour day. At the University, the
 forms of common laborers were \$40 a week. Two workers

14. 1955-56, 56-57.

15. 1955-56, 56-57.

averaged \$520 weekly. Some other figures were elevator operators: \$360 a week; truck driver: \$324 a week; and warehouse clerk: \$262 a week. All these costs were passed on to the Government and to the taxpayer by virtue of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.¹⁸

Work slow-downs were another form of labor trouble. In several instances unions demanded that factory-assembled equipment be torn down and reassembled at construction sites because such assembly should be the job of the missile-site union employees. Examples occurred whereby contractors allowed the workers to figure the time it took to disassemble and assemble and then sit idly by for the required length of time. The excuse for this from the contractors' standpoint was so that the tolerances and configuration of the equipment would not be changed by the construction site workers.¹⁹

Work stoppages as manifested in strikes resulted in much delay in construction work. These strikes resulted from the various causes and reasons as previously discussed. How significant were the strikes? How much time-loss resulted from them?

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 125-129.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 100-101.

recovered \$219 more. These other lights were shown again
 times 4 and 5 (total \$105 a week) and returned
 after 122 a week. All these costs were passed on to the
 Government and the taxpayer by virtue of cost-plus-plus-
 fee contracts. 14

Such agreements were made for the purpose, in
 several instances, of obtaining that industry-recognized
 equipment be used and maintained in accordance with
 because such savings would be the job of the contractor
 under contract. Examples of such savings would be
 the workers to light the time it took to disassemble and
 assemble and then the bill by the taxpayer for the time.
 The reason for this from the contractor's standpoint was to
 that the taxpayer and contractor at the expense would
 not be charged by the Government also would. 15

Not enough is mentioned in either contract in
 with help in construction work. These would include from
 the various items and items as previously discussed. Now
 different were the prices. Now with time-left savings
 from time?

161014-1, pp. 125-129

161014-1, pp. 130-131

Man-days of Labor Lost

Statistical measures of time lost due to work stoppages are made in terms of the man-days of lost labor occurring as a result of work interruptions. A man-day is calculated on the basis of an 8-hour work day. This form of measurement is utilized by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and has been adopted by those authorities who have compiled missile-site labor information. Missile-site labor statistics have appeared in Congressional records and in reports of the Missile Sites Labor Commission.

The published record of the McClellan Committee hearings does not reflect any overall compilation. Figures presented by various witnesses at the hearings are reflective of occurrences within certain phases of the construction program. Those hearings statistics considered most significant pertain to two areas--work stoppages at Cape Canaveral, and a summary of man-days lost at ICBM missile sites.

The Cape Canaveral figures were compiled by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers who administer certain construction responsibilities at the missile-sites. At Cape Canaveral, there were 103 work stoppages with 88,503 man-days lost from July 1956 through December 1960. This total includes construction, industrial, and maintenance workers.²⁰

²⁰U. S. Senate, op. cit., p. 12.

ICBM base figures were compiled by the U. S. Air Force. These pertain to totals of man-days lost and strikes at 19 operational missile-sites and at 3 test sites. The time period for the statistics included time lapse from start of construction through March 31, 1961. As revealed, there were 327 work stoppages and 162,872 man-days lost.²¹

The significance of the foregoing statistics is that they provided, in 1961, a basis for an urgent, detailed review of the problem and highlighted the need for immediate action to curb the delay being caused to the missile-site construction program.

An overall compilation of man-days lost is available in Missile Sites Labor Commission records. These reveal that during the period July 1956 through May 1961, there were 17,781,000 man-days worked and 185-478 man-days lost in the missile-site construction program due to work stoppages.²² Charts comparing these statistics to more recent ones will be presented in Chapter V; these will illustrate in graphic detail the trends from 1956 through June 1963. In order to clarify the man-days worked versus man-days lost situation

²¹Ibid.

²²U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S. Missile Sites June 1961-May 1962, July 1962, p. 10.

Local news reports were supplied by the U. S. Air Force.

These periods are based on semi-weekly loss and recovery as is operational maintenance and on a loss basis. The time period for the operation included time taken from start of construction through March 31, 1961. As indicated, there were 117 work stoppages and 103,473 man-days lost.²¹

The significance of the foregoing statistics is that they provided, in 1961, a basis for an urgent, detailed review of the problem and highlighted the need for immediate action to curb the delay being caused by the maintenance construction program.

An overall comparison of man-days lost is available in Exhibit A-1, which compares the loss of man-days lost during the period July 1956 through May 1961. Some 11,701,000 man-days worked and 143,473 man-days lost in the maintenance construction program due to work stoppages.²² Charts comparing these statistics to work records now will be provided in Chapter V; these will illustrate in graphic detail the trends from 1956 through June 1961. As will be clearly the man-days worked versus man-days lost situation

21/61.

²¹ U. S. Marine Corps Loss Statistics, August 22, 1961.
²² U. S. Marine Corps Loss Statistics, August 22, 1961.
 9. 10.

from July 1956 through May 1961. Table 1 has been prepared containing percentage and ratio analyses.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF MAN-DAYS WORKED
AND MAN-DAYS LOST AT U.S.
MISSILE BASES, JULY 1956
THROUGH MAY 1961^a

Man-Days Worked	17,781,000
Man-Days Lost	185,478
Per Cent Lost to Worked	1.04
Ratio Worked to Lost	96 to 1

^aSource: U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission,
Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S.
Missile Sites June 1961-May 1962,
July 1962, p. 10.

The relationship of man-days lost to man-days worked, expressed as a percentage, is the most common measure of the effect of work stoppages.²³ The overall loss rate of all the missile-sites for the July 1956-May 1961 period was 1.04 per cent. This means that 96 man-days were worked for each man-day lost.

Comparison of Missile Sites Labor Statistics
with All Industry and Contract Construction

A comparison of contract construction and all industry work stoppage data with missile-site labor statistics reveals

²³Ibid., p. 4.

from July 1950 through May 1951. Table I has been prepared containing percentages and ratio analysis.

TABLE I

RELATIONSHIP OF MAN-DAYS WORKED
AND MAN-DAYS LOST AT U.S.
STEEL PLANT, JULY 1950
THROUGH MAY 1951

Man-days worked	17,771,000
Man-days lost	12,745
Per cent lost to worked	1.44
Ratio worked to lost	96 to 1

Source: U. S. Steel Plant Labor Commission,
Analysis of Work Stoppages at U. S.
Steel Plant, June 1951-May 1952
July 1951, p. 12.

The relationship of man-days lost to man-days worked, expressed as a percentage, in the steel industry is the ratio of work stoppages.¹² The overall loss rate at all the steel plants for the July 1950-May 1951 period was 1.04 per cent. This means that for every day work stopped, much more day lost.

Comparison of 1951 Steel Plant Statistics
with All Industry and General Statistics

A comparison of various statistics and all industry work stoppage data with steel-plant statistics reveals

some significant information. Table 2 provides this comparison.

An analysis of Table 2 shows that the relationship between man-days lost and man-days worked in contract construction and all industry may be expressed as a percentage and compared with missile-site data. On the missile-sites, the overall loss rate was 1.04, meaning that 96 man-days were worked for every man-day lost. For contract construction, the corresponding percentage was .55, or 190 man-days worked for each man-day lost. For all U. S. industry, the corresponding percentage was .26, meaning 333 man-days were worked for each one lost.

The significance of these figures is that there was more labor time lost at the missile-sites relatively speaking, than in either contract construction or in U. S. industry as a whole. This points out the seriousness of labor problems affecting the missile program. If these missile-site labor problems are considered in conjunction with the characteristics of labor relations in the building trades, for instance, they stand out as significant.

It is a general characteristic of the construction and building industry that, despite size, no cohesiveness nor integration of firms, products, managerial functions, and

some significant information. Table 1 provides this com-

parison.

An analysis of Table 1 shows that the relationship between
man-days lost and man-days worked in contract construction and
all industry may be expressed as a percentage and compared
with similar data. On the similar data, the overall
loss rate was 1.90, meaning that 10 man-days were worked for
every one-day lost. For contract construction, the corresponding
percentage was .25, or 100 man-days worked for each man-day
lost. For all U. S. industry, the corresponding percentage
was .20, meaning 100 man-days were worked for each day lost.
The significance of these figures is that there was more
labor time lost in the similar data relative to contract, than
in either contract construction or all U. S. industry as a
whole. This points out the seriousness of labor problems
affecting the similar project. If these similar data
problems are considered in conjunction with the characteristics
of labor relative to the building sector, the importance may
be made even more significant.

It is a general characteristic of the construction and
building industry that, despite the fact, an individual may
transcribe all time, resources, managerial functions, and

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF LOST TIME AT MISSILE SITES
WITH CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION AND ALL
INDUSTRY JULY 1956-MAY 1961

	Missile Sites ^a	All Contract Construction in U.S. ^b	All Industry in U. S. ^b
Man-Days Worked	17,781,000	-	-
Man-Days Lost	185,478	20,435,000	153,200,000
Per Cent Lost to Worked	1.04	.55	.26
Ratio Worked to Lost	96 to 1	190 to 1	333 to 1

^aSource: U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S. Missile Sites June 1961-May 1962, July 1962, p. 10.

^bSource: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review; Vol. 80, 1957, pp. 566 and 569; Vol. 81, 1958, pp. 486-487; Vol. 82, 1959, pp. 637 and 640; Vol. 83, 1960, Statistical Supplement, pp. 58 and 60; Vol. 84, 1961, pp. 615 and 617; Vol. 85, 1962, pp. 662 and 666.
(NOTE: Figures for half-years 1956 and 1961 are interpolated.)

production technique has been widely adopted.²⁴ As concerning missile-site construction it seems that a greater opportunity for achieving such cohesiveness and integration would exist. The firms participating in missile-site construction should be integrated in a higher fashion than others in the economy; they would work in an environment of similar geographical, topographical, administrative, legal, and purposeful considerations. While the products are not exactly the same, they are at least integrals of a common whole. They become entities of the same physical structures and could be considered like products in that they comprise a definite, distinguishable physical resultant. While managerial functions are not performed by the same administrators, these administrators are related by the environment in which they work. The techniques of construction at missile-sites could be related by virtue of their employment within the missile-site construction atmosphere. All this means that there should be opportunity for missile-site construction labor relations to be better organized and better coordinated than in other construction situations. Yet this is not the case. Statistics show that there was less

²⁴William Haber and Harold M. Levinson, Labor Relations and Productivity in the Building Trades (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Bureau of Industrial Relations, 1956), p. 9.

productive elements had been already absorbed.¹⁴ In consequence
 inevitable destruction is bound to be a direct consequence
 for existing economic conditions and integration would result.
 The lines separating the various economic regions would
 be integrated in a single domain then would in the economy,
 they would move in an environment of social geographical,
 geographical, administrative, legal, and economic consider-
 ations. While the products are not exactly the same, they are
 at least elements of a common whole. They become elements of
 the same physical structure and would be considered like
 products in that they comprise a definite, distinguishable
 physical element. While managerial functions are not per-
 formed by the same individuals, these individuals are
 related by the environment in which they work. The conditions
 of production by individuals could be related by nature
 of their employment while the material conditions of work-
 ing. All this means that there would be opportunity for
 inevitable economic integration to be a direct consequence
 and better development than in other economic situations.
 But this is not the same. Integration does not mean the same

¹⁴William Fisher and David K. Johnson, *Legal Relations
 and Property in the United States* (New York: University
 of Michigan Bureau of Industrial Relations, 1934), p. 4.

stable labor relations during 1956-1961 at missile-sites than in other contract construction.

The main reasons for these labor troubles have already been discussed. Analysis has revealed the underlying current of jurisdictional, contract negotiation, union-nonunion, and other grievance disputes that have led to the statistical record.

Summary

The problem of labor disputes at U. S. missile bases reached acute proportions by the Spring of 1961. Labor troubles resulted from the unique situation of the missile-site construction program, the joint occupancy of construction areas by industrial and craft type unions, administrative difficulties as manifested in wage-rate and overtime applications, and the fact that the need for progress often necessitated that Labor's demands be acquiesced to in the interests of maintaining productive work schedules.

During the period July 1956-May 1961 there were 96 man-days worked at missile-sites for each man-day lost due to work stoppages. In all U. S. contract construction there were 190 man-days worked for each lost. In all U. S. industry the ratio was 333 to 1. These statistics clearly show the need that existed for improvement in missile-site labor relations.

single labor relations during 1955-1961 as miscellaneous than in other recent connection.

The main reason for these labor troubles have already been discussed. Analysis has revealed the underlying nature of industrial, contract negotiation, union-management, and other grievances disputes that have led to the statistical record.

Summary

The studies of labor relations at U. S. Atomic Energy reached some proportion by the Spring of 1961. Labor troubles resulted from the unique situation of the atomic-energy production program, the joint ownership of construction areas by industrial and civil type entities, administrative difficulties as manifested in wage-rate and overtime applications, and the fact that the need for progress often necessitated that labor's demands be responded to in the interests of maintaining productive work schedules.

During the period July 1955-May 1961 there were 34 work-days worked at atomic-energy for each man-day lost due to work stoppages. In all U. S. contract construction there were 150 man-days worked for each lost. In all U. S. industry the ratio was 33 to 1. These statistics clearly show the need that existed for improvement in atomic-energy labor relations.

Some means were evidently necessary for attaining a better record of labor stability. The requirement that improvement be affected immediately was evident. Clearly the labor troubles were affecting progress in missile-site construction. The sites were designed to aid in maintaining national security. It was imperative that their completion be achieved quickly and efficiently.

The position of Labor during the 1950's was improved considerably and unions were able as never before to demand shares of business profits. The demands of Labor had not yet been proven as detrimental to national security. However, increasing concern over labor disputes at missile-sites began to clarify labor abuses that evidently affected the interests of the nation. Here was a definite and recognizable need for action to curtail Labor's activities.

What method seemed appropriate for negotiating labor peace in this area of conflict between Labor and Management that was evidently affecting national security? Previous analysis has demonstrated that Federal Government participation in labor-management relations was an historically acceptable method. Could this be employed in the missile program? What issues surround Government intervention in this respect? The following chapter will set forth these considerations.

...from which were obviously necessary for maintaining a better
 record of labor stability. The improvement that improvement
 he effected immediately was evident. Clearly the labor
 problem was affecting progress in stabilizing production.
 The labor was designed to act as a stabilizing factor.
 It was important that their condition be improved quickly
 and efficiently.

The condition of labor during the 1930's was improved
 considerably and some were able to even begin to handle
 some of business profits. The condition of labor had not yet
 been given an opportunity to stabilize security. However,
 labor's condition was labor's condition at this time. Japan
 to clarify labor shows that security should be improved
 at the time. There was a definite and significant
 for action to control labor's security.

...that would have been expected for production, labor
 given in this case of conflict between labor and management
 that was obviously affecting national security. Further
 analysis has demonstrated that labor's government participation
 in labor-management relations was an obviously important
 matter. Such this as implied in the results of the
 labor's condition government intervention in this respect
 The following figure will set forth some conclusions.

CHAPTER IV

THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

AS A THIRD-PARTY TO LABOR DISPUTES

CHAPTER IV

THE ISSUE OF LIBERAL GOVERNMENT IN INDIA

AS A THIRD-VARIABLE IN THE DIVISION

Introduction

The previous chapter detailed a substantial record of labor problems at U. S. missile bases. Through comparative analysis with the effects of labor disputes in other areas of the economy, it was demonstrated that missile-site labor troubles were of alarming proportion. Clearly, such a combination of results, if allowed to progress, would seriously impede the effectiveness of the missile program as a means of enhancing national security.

As these problems became generally recognized as having detrimental effect upon the nation's missile program, what were the attitudes of Labor, Management, and the Federal Government? This chapter will explore these through an analysis of the overall issue surrounding Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes.

Government and the Public Interest

The general acceptability of Government participation in labor-management relations has already been established. It has been shown that Government intervention is to be expected when labor dispute problems have detrimental effect upon national security. Therefore, when missile-site labor troubles

Introduction

The previous chapter described a substantial record of labor problems in U. S. classic cases. Through comparative analysis with the effects of labor disputes in other areas of the economy, it was demonstrated that classic-type labor troubles were of striking frequency. Clearly, such a comparison of results, if allowed to progress, would naturally impinge the effectiveness of the classic program as a means of solving the national economy.

As these problems become generally recognized as having detrimental effects upon the nation's classic program, what were the reactions of labor, management, and the Federal Government? This chapter will explore these through an analysis of the overall labor-management-government interaction as a third-party to labor disputes.

Government and the Labor Problem

The general acceptability of Government participation in labor-management relations has already been established. It has been shown that Government intervention is to be expected when labor disputes produce have detrimental effects upon national economy. Therefore, when classic-type labor troubles

became a problem of national concern, some form of Government action designed to curb the abuses was expected. The issue surrounding Government intervention, then, becomes a matter of establishing "rational governmental policy"¹ rather than the propriety of participation.

To provide additional perspective in considering the separate views of Labor, Management, and Government regarding Government intervention, it is appropriate to point out two significant considerations. First of all, the matter must be discussed with the public interest in mind. This is unavoidable, for as Hanslowe states, "meaningful discussion . . . cannot avoid examination of the public interest in general."²

Secondly, participation or intervention by the Federal Government must be recognized as designed to supplement, not to supplant, the bargaining relationship between employees and their employer. Hildebrand has called this "trilateralism."³ The term fits well the situation whereby the parties are considered to seek superior results to those attainable by Labor and Management themselves.

¹This reasoning is developed in detail by William Gomberg in "Government Participation in Union Regulation and Collective Bargaining," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 13, November 1962, pp.921-952.

²K. L. Hanslowe, "Labor Law and the Public Interest," Journal of Public Law, Vol. 11, Spring 1962, p. 27.

³G. H. Hildebrand, "Use of Tripartite Bodies to Supplement Collective Bargaining," Labor Law Journal, Vol.12, July 1961,p.656.

between a problem of national interest, since this is Government action designed to curb the disease now rampant. The issue between Government intervention, then, becomes a matter of establishing "national Governmental policy" rather than the propriety of participation.

To provide additional perspective in considering the separate views of labor, management, and Government regarding Government intervention, it is suggested to pose the two significant considerations. First of all, the extent to which discussed with the public interest in mind. This is inseparable for as immediate issues, "national interest" is a term used to denote the public interest in general.¹ Secondly, participation of intervention by the Federal Government must be recognized as designed to supplement, not to replace, the negotiating relationship between employers and their employees. Management has coined the "criticism." The term like will the situation whereby the parties are considered to seek separate results in those decisions by labor and management themselves.

¹This meaning is developed in detail by Arthur G. Lewis in "Government Intervention in Union Relations and Collective Bargaining," *Labor Law Journal*, Vol. 12, December 1961, pp. 481-482.

²E. L. Greenfield, "Labor Law and the Public Interest," *Journal of Public Law*, Vol. 11, Spring 1962, p. 11.

³E. L. Greenfield, "Use of Tripartite Bodies to Supplement Collective Bargaining," *Labor Law Journal*, Vol. 12, July 1961, p. 4.

It must be understood that questions regarding governmental policy in missile-site labor matters are wrapped up in more comprehensive considerations relating to tripartite labor relations in general. This larger question relates a great deal to collective bargaining as a social institution and to the entire scope of labor-management relations; decisions emanating from these relationships affect the very core of the public versus private dilemma--the dilemma of matching public and private interests within the framework of a democratic society.

Furthermore, problems created by changing technology cannot be separated from the analysis. The fact that Government has become so involved in the processes of collective bargaining reflects the many problems with which the institution of collective bargaining has become concerned. To amplify this:

The intensity of the race for improved technology poses an increasingly serious challenge to collective bargaining to resolve labor-management conflicts in a cooperative and positive fashion. Collective bargaining is on trial. The nature of technological change carries with it the threat of great labor strife as well as the opportunity for great advance in labor-management cooperation. The survival of collective bargaining as an expression of the intent of free men to work out their problems in democratic fashion depends upon the way collective bargaining meets with this new challenge.⁴

⁴John W. McConnell, Dean of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.

It must be understood that questions regarding government policy in relation to Japan must not be mixed up with more fundamental considerations relating to the Japanese situation in general. This latter question relates to the need for collective bargaining as a social institution and to the social aspects of labor-management relations; decisions concerning these relationships affect the very core of the public sector's private domain--the system of national production and private Japanese within the framework of a democratic society.

Furthermore, problems created by changing technology cannot be separated from the social. The fact that government has become so involved in the processes of collective bargaining reflects the many problems with which the institution of collective bargaining has become concerned. In dealing with

The necessity of the need for improved technology poses an increasingly serious challenge to collective bargaining as a social institution. Collective bargaining is on trial. The system of technology management which is the basis of great labor union activity is the opportunity for social progress in labor-management cooperation. The survival of collective bargaining as an institution of the future is now being put to a test. It is necessary to examine the points upon which the collective bargaining system will

¹ John V. Johnson, Dept. of Social Science, Cornell University, of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.

When Labor and Management are considered as the only parties to collective bargaining practices, then the results of their actions must conform to the public interest in general, in order to be acceptable to the society. If not acceptable, then it is the responsibility of the Government to act in behalf of the public interest. Any tendency toward more and more governmental participation in labor relations reflects the inability of Labor and Management to serve their own interests simultaneously with societal ones.

However, the mere participation of Government in labor matters does not ensure successful prosecution of national interests.⁵ Again there is the difficulty of matching political, economic, and moral considerations among Labor, Management, and the Federal Government whose position may possibly reflect bias. The difficulty of achieving absolute impartiality is a basic factor to be considered.

Where, then, does Government stand in relation to missile-site labor disputes? The answer is that the Federal Government stands alongside the field of labor controversy and watches the development of labor troubles. As long as the troubles effect only the interests of Labor and Management and have no ill effect upon societal considerations, then no basis for

Excerpted from a panel discussion, Sixth Annual Convention Proceedings, National Association of State Labor Relations Agencies. Cited in Labor Law Journal, Vol. 13, November 1962, p. 938.

⁵Weaknesses in the present system are examined by J. A. Raffaele; "Needed: A Fourth Party in Industrial Relations," Labor Law Journal, Vol.13, March 1962, pp. 230-244.

When labor and management are considered as the only parties to collective bargaining processes, then the results of their actions may appear to be the public interest in general, in order to be acceptable to the society. It is not acceptable, then, to the responsibility of the Government to act in the half of the public interest. Any tendency toward more and more governmental participation in labor relations reflects the inability of labor and management to serve their own interests simultaneously with societal ones.

However, the mere participation of Government in labor matters does not ensure successful prosecution of national interests. Again there is the difficulty of reaching political, economic, and moral considerations among labor, management, and the Federal Government which position may possibly reflect them. The difficulty of achieving absolute impartiality is a basic factor in the construction.

Where, then, does Government stand in relation to industrial labor disputes? The answer is that the Federal Government stands alongside the field of labor controversy and within the development of labor troubles. As long as the trouble exists only the interests of labor and management and none in all effect upon societal considerations, then no basis for

²Excerpted from a panel discussion, Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association of State Labor Relations Agencies, held in New York, Vol. 12, November 1951, p. 304.

³Excerpted from the present system are contained in "Labor Relations: A Study of the Federal Government's Role," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 12, March 1951, pp. 125-126.

governmental intervention exists. But when labor disputes wrapped up in the overall tripartite dilemma evidence detrimental tendencies, then some action becomes necessary.

Alternatives

Obviously there must exist certain alternatives available to Labor, Management, and Government as pertaining to these labor problems. One way to consider Labor and Management alternatives is to look at both as having an opportunity to take two courses of action. One is to bargain collectively in pursuit of resolutions, while continuing to meet missile-site construction responsibilities. The other alternative would be not to bargain about the issues. The results of the second alternative in the case of Labor, for example, would be work stoppages, work slow-downs, and the like. This is the course followed, and the result was the harm being brought to national security as the problem took on greater import.

On the other hand, Government, by virtue of the failure of Labor and Management to contain the effects of labor controversies, stands appropriately ready to intervene. What alternatives are available in this case? Several alternatives may be considered. These may be comprised of strike prohibition through the enactment of Federal legislation, compulsory

arbitration, governmental seizure of construction operations, vigorous enforcement of existing laws, economic persuasion, or more efficient governmental administration.⁶ How well would any of these alternatives serve the best interests of the American public?

The first alternative, strike prohibition, would not conform with the ideals of democratic labor-management relations. The use of the strike as an economic force in collective bargaining is a well established principle in American labor relations. Federal legislation of this type would be vigorously opposed by Labor and by many other areas of society. Arguments against such would stress the loss of freedom of choice for employees in dispensing labor services. Strike prohibition would not, after all, alleviate the many and varied troubles occurring in missile-site construction. Disputes would still occur. The prohibition of strikes would merely serve to aggravate the attitudes of workers, and although officially the construction work might continue in progress, no assurance could be provided for the preservation of quality and best speed commensurate with such.

⁶John B. Abercrombie, "Labor Relations Under AEC and NASA Programs," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 14, January 1963, p. 104.

arbitrariness, government's interest in administrative matters, vigorous enforcement of existing laws, economic principles, or more efficient governmental administration.⁶ But only would any of these alternatives serve the best interests of the

American people.

The first alternative, states legislation, would not

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would be vigorously opposed by labor and by many other groups

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freedom of choice for employees in determining their salaries,

union prohibition would not, after all, eliminate the way

and varied troubles occurring in strike-line competition.

Disputes would still occur. The prohibition of strikes would

merely serve to aggravate the situation of workers, and it

though ultimately the competitive spirit might weaken in pro-

gress, no assurance could be provided for the preservation of

quality and best priced commodities with such.

⁶John A. MacArthur, "Labor Relations Under the New Deal Program," *Labor Law Journal*, Vol. 14, January 1913, p. 100.

Compulsory arbitration as a second alternative would still not serve to assure progress in resolving missile-site labor disputes. Labor and Management representatives would not be organized in any common, objective form of relationship whereby overall goals and working plans could be formulated. A large measure of the problem reflects varied interests. The disputes as experienced were so numerous that little aid would be afforded by the time-consuming processes of compulsory arbitration.

What about government seizure of construction operations? The railroads were operated by the Federal Government during World War I. Could Government perform similarly in the case of the missile-site problem? No, this would not be a feasible solution. The Federal Government would be acting out of context with established principles of economic, industrial, and societal working relationships. Free enterprise would not progress in an atmosphere of Government domination such as would result from governmental control of construction. Also, it would not be practical from administrative and economical standpoints for the Government to construct the sites in this manner.

Could vigorous enforcement of existing laws alleviate the problem? No, the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, for

Compulsory arbitration as a second alternative would still not serve to secure progress in resolving industrial labor disputes. Labor and Management representatives would not be organized in any manner, objective form of relationship whereby mutually profitable and working plans could be formulated. A large measure of the problem remains varied interests. The elements as experienced were no numerous than little and would be attracted by the time-consuming processes of compulsory arbitration.

What about Government seizure of industrial operations? The rationale was suggested by the Federal Government during World War I. Could Government action similarly in the case of the electric-light problem? No, this would not be a feasible solution. The Federal Government would be taking out of business with established principles of economic, industrial, and federal working relationships. Free enterprise would not progress to an atmosphere of Government domination such as would result from Governmental control of construction, also. It would not be practical from administrative and economical standpoints for the Government to conduct the lines in this manner.

Could a system of nationalization of electric lines replace the problem? No, the provisions of the Rail-Transport Act, 1920

instance, as pertaining to national emergency disputes would not serve the purposes required in ameliorating missile-site labor troubles. The machinery of existing laws would be inadequate in reaching the personal, human elements imbedded in the construction labor problems.

Could economic persuasion by the Federal Government attain the desired results? No, this alternative would not be feasible either. No amount of economic leverage in contract administration or other form of action could reach the core of the troubled relations between the employees engaged in missile-site construction and their employers.

Efficient governmental administration might improve organizational relationships, work scheduling, cost analyses, and the like to a measurable extent. However, these improvements would not reach the source of labor controversies.

What is Government to do? There is an alternative not yet suggested. This is one of participation in labor relations activities through tripartite action similar to previous experiences. The establishment of some form of Commission or Board comprised of Labor, Management, and public representatives to administer to labor dispute troubles might be in order. In this way, through Government sponsorship, the interests of private individuals from both Labor and Management areas, as

insects, in providing to national economic growth with
not have the purpose required in maintaining efficiency
labor market. The necessity of creating new work in
industry is creating the potential for economic growth
in the domestic labor market.

Could economic growth be the Federal Government's

the desired result? No, this alternative would not be
impossible either. No amount of economic growth in domestic
production or other form of action could reach the level
of the provided relation between the employees engaged in
statistical correlation and their employees.

Efficient government administration might require
organizational relationships, work planning, and analysis,
and the time to a successful outcome. However, these require-
ments would not reach the level of labor productivity.

What is government to do? There is an alternative and

yet suggested. This is one of participation in labor relations
activities through regular action similar to previous
experience. The establishment of some form of committee or
board composed of labor, management, and public representatives
to administer the labor dispute process might be in order.
In this way, through permanent representation, the interests of
private individuals from both labor and management sides, as

well as the general public interest, could be ascertained as having been considered in any particular course of ameliorative action. This alternative was the one chosen. The form of approach taken by the Federal Government is reflected in the establishment of the Missile Sites Labor Commission by virtue of an Executive Order issued by the President of the United States.

However, in order to clarify the position of Labor, Management, and Government concerning the issue of tripartite action in labor relations, it is appropriate to set forth separate views representing each in the matter. A discussion of these views in company with a review of national labor policy and recent attempts toward achieving industrial peace will aid substantially in understanding the atmosphere of cooperation experienced in the activities of the Missile Sites Labor Commission.

National Labor Policy

What is the basic governmental policy in labor relations? An understanding of this provides a measure of perspective and orientation to the issue of tripartitism in general. Fundamentally, the policy of the Federal Government is "that of assuring to every worker the right to join unions of his

well as the general public interest, should be recognized as being based primarily on the position of the individual nation. This objective was the one which, in 1904, was adopted by the Federal Government as reflected in the establishment of the Russia-Labor Commission by virtue of an Executive Order issued by the President of the United States.

However, in order to clarify the position of labor, management, and Government concerning the issue of foreign labor in labor relations, it is appropriate to set forth certain basic principles which are in the nature of a declaration of these views in connection with a review of general labor policy and to point out the need for a national policy which is substantially in accordance with the principles of cooperation emphasized in the activities of the Russia-Labor Commission.

General Labor Policy

There is the basic governmental policy in labor relations. As substantiated by this provides a measure of cooperation and assistance to the labor of the individual in general. Fundamentally, the policy of the Federal Government is that of assisting to every worker the right to join unions of his

choosing and to foster the collective bargaining process."⁷ Of course, the right of the individual worker to join a union of choice is qualified by the application of majority desires in any individual group of workers voting on union representation. But overall, the opportunity to bargain collectively with employers has become firmly established as basic policy in American labor relations.

As the effects of private actions by employees and employers in the bargaining process have grown wider in scope and associated with the general interests of the public, governmental interest has grown in labor relations in order that the best interests of society may be served.

President's Advisory Committee on
Labor-Management Policy

On February 16, 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 10918 establishing the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy. Committee members were appointed representing the public at large, Labor, and Management, as well as the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Commerce.

⁷Joseph P. Goldberg, "The Changing Role of Government in Labor Relations," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 333, January 1961, p. 35.

concerning the labor the collective bargaining process. Of course, the right of the individual worker to join a union or union is qualified by the application of majority status in any industrial group of workers voting on union representation. But overall, the opportunity to bargain collectively with employers has become firmly established as basic right in American labor relations.

As one aspect of labor relations by employers and employees in the bargaining process and from which to some and associated with the general interests of the worker, however, social interests has grown in labor relations in order that the best interests of society may be served.

President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy

On February 10, 1951, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 10450 establishing the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy. Committee members were appointed representing the public at large, labor, and management, as well as the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Commerce.

Joseph P. Goldberger, "The Changing Role of Government in Labor Relations," Journal of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 101, January, 1951, p. 32.

This committee reflects an attempt to achieve greater cooperation, understanding, and free, responsible action in collective bargaining and labor-management relations in general. It is significant that this committee has promulgated the unanimous view that collective bargaining must be responsive to the public interest. Additionally, the Committee is unanimous in the view that forms of third-party assistance in collective bargaining and other labor relation activities can be used to good advantage. Expert assistance by third parties not only aids in factfinding, but helps in the analysis of particular problems, including actions of private mediation and the offering of recommendations on crucial issues.⁸

Third-party assistance is recognized as supplementary procedure only, however, and is not construed to be a primary method of dispute adjudication. The central emphasis is placed "on the development of bilateral relationships based on sufficient maturity, sophistication, and judgment to enable the parties to work out solutions appropriate to their particular circumstances. Responsibility flourishes best in an atmosphere of self-reliance."⁹

⁸President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, Free and Responsible Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace: A Report to the President, May 1, 1962, pp. 1-2.

⁹Ibid., p. 4.

This committee believes it should be advised that

cooperating, independent, and free, responsible action in

collective bargaining and labor-management relations in

general. It is significant that this committee has previously

the committee view that collective bargaining must be responsive

to the public interest. Additionally, the Committee is aware

now in the view that labor and third-party assistance in

collective bargaining and other labor relations activities

can be used to good advantage. Expert assistance by third

parties not only aids in fact-finding, but helps in the analysis

of particular problems, including solution of various problems

and the offering of recommendations of general interest.⁸

Third-party assistance is recognized as supplementary procedure

only, however, and is not intended to be a primary method

of dispute adjustment. The report emphasizes in places "or

the development of various collective bargaining based on voluntary

activity, negotiation, and judgment in resolving the parties

to work out private agreements in their particular circumstances.

Responsibility for these acts is an essential part

self-counsel.⁹

⁸ President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, From Adversity to Cooperative Relations and Labor Peace: A Report to the President, Vol. I, 1961, pp. 1-11.

The recognition that industry and labor must bear greater social responsibility in present-day labor relations, and the need for imaginative, improved, voluntary, and reasonable actions of third-party assistance is considered highly significant in relation to labor problems that have been experienced at U.S. missile bases.

Views on Government's Role

Representative views from Labor and Management alike strongly oppose the idea of compulsory arbitration in labor disputes. An assortment of techniques might be advanced as to the form that compulsory arbitration might take. A Labor spokesman states that "a system of compulsory arbitration would destroy collective bargaining."¹⁰ A further Labor view is that more consideration to human values is required than would result from governmental dictation of wages and working conditions such as might result from a compulsory arbitration.¹¹

Management representatives believe that the significant choice to be made lies between alternate degrees and forms of

¹⁰Peter Henle, "A Union Viewpoint," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 333, January 1961, p. 14.

¹¹Harry Van Arsdale, "The Role of Government in Collective Bargaining Negotiations," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 13, November 1962, p. 929.

The Commission has already and later will have
greater social responsibility in government action,
and the need for legislative, judicial, executive, and
treatment's system of minority business is considered
highly significant in relation to labor problems that have
been mentioned in U.S. media press.

Issue of Government's Role

Representative views from labor and management alike
strongly support the idea of company responsibility in labor
disputes. An agreement of responsibility might be reached as
to the form that company responsibility might take. A labor
agreement states that "a system of company responsibility
would be very effective in preventing" "a further labor
dispute is that some consideration be given to the
idea would result from Governmental action of some kind
working conditions such as might result from a company
action."

Management representatives believe that the significant
action to be made that business interests and labor

¹⁰ Peter Smith, "A Labor Viewpoint," Journal of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 111, January 1961,
p. 14.

¹¹ Harry Van Arsdale, "The Role of Government in Collective
Bargaining Negotiations," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 13, Jan-
uary 1961, p. 237.

government regulation; however, in the interests of an efficiently operating free enterprise system, top-level tripartite meetings of Labor, Management, and public representatives must be utilized with caution.¹³

The consensus appears to be that Government intervention bespeaking definite provision for arriving at decisions in labor dispute matters would be inappropriate. In essence, neither Labor nor Management is willing to go on record as agreeing to the concept that they must reach final accord, through bargaining, with the opposition party to labor disputes. Each would reserve the opportunity to decide on acceptable terms.

The incompatibility of required conformance to terms posed by either negotiating party, or a third-party, with the opportunity of choice in a competitive free enterprise economy, is considered to constitute the main concern of Labor and Management.

How do Government representatives stand in relation to the overall issue? The consensus here is that the right of Government is not a license for widespread intervention,¹⁴ but

¹²William G. Caples, "A Management Viewpoint," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 333, January 1961, p. 17.

¹³Conrad R. Cooper, "The National Interest in Collective Bargaining," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 13, November 1962, p. 932.

¹⁴W. E. Simkin, "Third Seat at the Bargaining Table: A Government Point of View," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 14, January 1963, p. 9.

Government regulation, however, in the interests of an efficiently operating free enterprise system, the level of competition, the methods of labor, management, and public representatives must be utilized with caution.

The consensus appears to be that Government intervention in regulating business provision for arriving at decisions in labor dispute matters would be inappropriate. In essence, neither labor nor management is willing to go on record as agreeing to the concept that they must reach final accord, through bargaining, with the opposition party to labor disputes. Each would reserve the opportunity to decide on acceptable terms.

The desirability of required compromise to issues posed by either regulating party, or a third-party, with the opportunity of choice in a competitive free enterprise economy, is considered to constitute the main concern of labor and management.

How do Government representatives stand in relation to the overall issue? The consensus here is that the right of Government is not a license for widespread intervention, in the

12 William D. Gapes, "A Management Viewpoint," Journal of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 213, January 1961, p. 11.

13 George E. Cooper, "The National Interest in Collective Bargaining," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 12, November 1961, p. 431.

14 W. E. Rinehart, "What Says at the Bargaining Table?" Government Point of View, Labor Law Journal, Vol. 16, January 1962, p. 8.

is instead based on the need for action in the public interest.¹⁵

The proper role of Government, as conveyed by the pattern of consensus among Labor, Management, and Government representatives, is partly one of providing definite forms of third-party assistance. Therefore, there is no denial that tripartite action serves the best interest of the general public.

Summary

In the free enterprise society that comprises American ideals of democratic opportunities, there is a need for Labor and Management to have the opportunity of working out their problems in mutual confidence. This opportunity is provided in the processes of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining includes not only the negotiation of labor contracts, but also provides for the review, consideration, and adjudication of labor disputes as they occur. Labor and Management in the free enterprise system are afforded the means by which they may serve their individual interests. The problem of aligning these private interests with public interests results in tripartite action in labor-management relations due to the

¹⁵James J. Reynolds, "The Role of Government in Collective Bargaining Negotiations: The Public Interest," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 13, November 1962, p. 928.

is intended to be used for action in the future.

October 12

The paper role of Government, as envisaged by the authors of commonwealth, labor, management, and government, is summarized, in part, by the following table:

Third-party relations. Therefore, there is no doubt that tripartite action serves the best interests of the people.

Summary

In the first paragraph, it is pointed out that the authors' ideas of domestic opportunities, there is a need for labor and management to have the opportunity of working out their problems in mutual confidence. This opportunity is provided in the process of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining includes not only the negotiation of labor contracts, but also provides for the review, renegotiation, and adjustment of labor agreements as they occur. Labor and management in the free enterprise system are afforded the means by which they may serve their individual interests. The problem of aligning these private interests with public interests results in tripartite action in labor-management relations.

James J. Reynolds, "The Role of Government in Collective Bargaining Negotiations: The Public Interest," *Labor Law Journal*, Vol. 13, November 1961, p. 221.

Federal Government's responsibility for serving the best interests of society.

Labor and Management agree that Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes is necessary and helpful. The application of method by which aid should be afforded, however, is controversial. Nevertheless consensus has been garnered in some areas of labor conflict pertaining to method in tripartite action. Such consensus is illustrated in the method of solution applied toward labor problems at U. S. missile bases.

The establishment of a Missile Sites Labor Commission is a definite form of tripartite action. The requirement that tripartite action be taken has been clearly demonstrated. The form has been defined, but not analyzed. This will be accomplished in the following chapter, after which conclusions will be set forth regarding the issue of Federal Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes, based on the analysis of missile-site labor experiences.

Federal Government's responsibility for solving the labor
 problems of industry.

Labor and management agree that Government intervention
 as a third-party to labor disputes is necessary and helpful.
 The application of methods by which aid should be afforded,
 however, is controversial. Governmental intervention has been
 returned in some cases of labor conflict pertaining to

method in specific action. Such intervention is illustrated
 in the method of action applied toward labor problems
 at U. S. Steel's plant.

The establishment of a classic labor problem
 in a definite case of industrial action. The requirement
 that specific action be taken has been clearly demonstrated.
 The first has been defined, and analyzed. This will be
 exemplified in the following chapter, after which conclusions
 will be set forth regarding the issue of Federal Government
 intervention as a third-party to labor disputes, based
 on the analysis of classic labor problems.

CHAPTER V

THE MISSILE SITES LABOR COMMISSION

CHAPTER 9

THE EIGHTH EIGHTY EIGHTS

Introduction

The record of labor problems occurring at U. S. missile bases has been discussed in relation to the issue of tripartitism in general. This chapter will detail specific governmental action designed and implemented to resolve the labor disputes having detrimental effect on the nation's missile-site construction program. This analysis will illustrate the effectiveness and the value of Government participation in labor-management relations. Included in this analysis will be the establishment, purpose, membership, adjustment machinery, policies, rulings and decisions, and the record of improvement in missile-site labor relations attained since the Commission was established.

Establishment

As a result of hearings on missile-site labor disputes before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, the Secretary of Labor held a series of meetings in the Spring of 1961 with representatives of Labor, Management, and the public, directed toward finding a solution to labor problems at U. S. missile bases.¹

¹U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, United for America: A Report to the President of the United States, May 26, 1962, p. 2.

Introduction

The report of labor problems occurring at U. S. plants has been discussed in relation to the issue of industrialism in general. This chapter will detail specific governmental action designed and implemented to resolve the labor disputes having organizational effect on the nation's economic situation. This chapter will illustrate the effectiveness and the value of Government intervention in labor-management relations. Included in this chapter will be the establishment, purpose, membership, objectives, authority, policy, strategy and decision, and the record of improvement in labor-management relations since the question was established.

Establishment

As a result of hearings on labor-management relations before the House Committee on Education and the Senate Committee on Government Operations, the necessity of labor law was recognized in the Spring of 1933 with representatives of labor, management, and the public, discussed issues leading to a solution of labor problems at U. S. plants.

Primarily as a result of these meetings,² a "no-strike, no-lockout" pledge was made by Labor and Management leaders whose employees were involved in a missile-site construction. This pledge was a voluntary one. It reflected a genuine concern on the part of union and company leaders regarding labor disputes at the missile bases.

Despite the pledge, however, strikes continued in the missile-site construction program. The Secretary of Labor set up a three-man team to try to resolve the disputes. In addition, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service "put its men on a 24-hour alert to intervene instantly in any labor disputes at the missile bases."³ These measures are indicative of the developing concern of the Federal Government for missile-site labor troubles. In analyzing this increased governmental concern, it is noted that definite action began to be taken soon after the Kennedy Administration took office in January 1961. Although congressional investigation of the missile-site labor disputes was in progress prior to this, the fact is that President Kennedy himself demanded more speed

²Ibid.

³"Featherbedding on the Pads," Time, Vol. 76, No. 19, May 5, 1961, p. 79.

primarily as a result of these meetings, a "no-loyalty" pledge was made by labor and management leaders whose employees were involved in a missile-site construction. This pledge was a voluntary one. It reflected a genuine concern on the part of union and company leaders regarding labor disputes at the missile bases.

Beside the pledge, however, action continued in the missile-site construction program. The Secretary of Labor set up a three-man team to try to resolve the dispute. In addition, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service "put its men on a 24-hour alert to intervene instantly in any labor disputes at the missile bases." These measures are indicative of the developing concern of the Federal Government for missile-site labor disputes. In analyzing this increased governmental concern, it is noted that definite action began to be taken soon after the Kennedy Administration took office in January 1961. Although congressional investigation of the missile-site labor disputes was in progress prior to this, the fact is that President Kennedy himself demanded more speed

2 Ibid.

² Testimony on the same, Id., Vol. 16, No. 12, May 2, 1961, p. 79.

in the missile base construction program soon after his inauguration.⁴ This interest of the new Administration, combined with the record of missile-site labor problems detailed during the McClellan Committee hearings and the increased concern of the American public over the issue, led to the issuance of Executive Order No. 10946 on May 26, 1961. The order established a program for resolving labor disputes at missile and space sites.

The establishment of this Commission illustrates the progression of governmental interest and participation in labor-management relations. Previous note has been made of the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy which was established on February 16, 1961. Although the establishment of the Missile Sites Labor Commission cannot be said to have stemmed directly from the Advisory Committee, it should be noted that governmental interest in labor matters through the Advisory Committee's tripartite form of Labor, Management, and public representatives do evidence a certain precedent. The Missile Sites Labor Commission, established for the specific purpose of developing policies, procedures, and methods of adjustment for resolving missile-site labor disputes,

⁴"Back of the Delay in U. S. Missile Bases," U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 50, No. 18, May 1, 1961, p. 61.

in the middle class construction program soon after his death.
 creation. This interest in the new Administration, combined
 with the need of assistance from various bodies during
 the initial transition period and the increased number
 of the American people over the time, led to the issuance
 of Executive Order No. 10450 on May 26, 1941. The order
 established a program for providing labor dispute in which
 and other things.

The responsibilities of this Commission included the
 preparation of governmental interests and participation in
 labor-management relations. Further work has been done of
 the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy
 which was established on February 16, 1941. Although the
 establishment of the War Relocation Authority seemed to
 not to have caused directly from the Advisory Committee, it
 should be noted that governmental interest in labor relations
 through the Advisory Committee's activities from 1939,
 management, and public representatives to establish a certain
 procedure. The War Relocation Authority established in
 the specific purpose of developing policies, programs, and
 methods of adjustment for displaced individuals labor disputes.

¹ "Copy of the letter to U. S. War Relocation Authority, May 26, 1941, p. 11.
 and War Relocation Authority, May 26, 1941, p. 11.

was also composed of representatives from these three areas acting under Government sponsorship.

The membership of the Missile Sites Labor Commission is composed of: the Secretary of Labor, designated as Chairman; the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, designated as Vice-chairman; three public representatives drawn from Labor; and three from Management, as designated by the President.

In this manner, workers and employers alike are afforded the opportunity to attend to private interests, while representatives of the general public bring into consideration the interests of American society as a whole. By virtue of the membership of the Secretary of Labor and the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the Federal Government also fulfills its responsibility for acting in the overall interest of the public which includes Labor and Management.

Adjustment Machinery

The Missile Sites Labor Commission has several procedures at its disposal in dealing with missile-site labor disputes:

At each missile or space site, the Commission will set up an on the spot committee consisting of representatives of manufacturers, construction firms, the international unions involved, the contracting agencies, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation

was also composed of representatives from these three bodies
acting under Government sponsorship.

The membership of the House of Representatives is
composed of the Secretary of Labor, designated as Chairman;
the Director of the Federal Election and Commission Service,
designated as Vice-Chairman; three public representatives
drawn from labor; and three from management, as designated by
the President.

In this manner, workers and employers alike are afforded
the opportunity to voice to private industry, public repre-
sentatives of the general public bring into consideration the
interests of American people as a whole. The views of the
members of the Secretary of Labor and the Director of the
Federal Election and Commission Service, the Federal Govern-
ment also fulfill its responsibility for action in the over-
all interests of the public which include labor and management.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

The House of Representatives has several procedures
at its disposal in dealing with House-also labor disputes:

At each House of Representatives, the Committee
will set up an ad hoc committee consisting of
representatives of management, construction firms,
the international unions involved, the contracting
agencies, and the Federal Election and Commission

Service. The job of these committees is to anticipate and solve problems before they become acute.

Existing voluntary dispute-adjustment machinery will be used, where effective....

Existing legal procedures also will continue to be used and will be augmented. A section of the executive order asks the NLRB and its General Counsel to set up 'accelerated procedures for dealing with matters at missile and space sites within the Board's jurisdiction, in accordance with the law.'

Disputes not disposed of by these procedures will be handled by special panels, composed of Commission members or others.... The panels will hold hearings and may make findings of fact, recommend a settlement, get agreement for final and binding arbitration, and take such other action as the Commission may order.⁵

Because of its voluntary and persuasive adjustment methods, the Missile Sites Labor Commission is unique. The tripartite labor relations committees at local levels were established for the specific purpose of solving labor problems before they develop into serious disputes. These local committees utilize the concepts of voluntarism and friendly persuasion to the greatest possible extent. These concepts are not unique; but the method by which they are employed are unique. In this manner, the local committees act as sounding boards for innumerable gripes and grievances; thereby providing an opportunity for discussion of these within an atmosphere of good will. The availability of such opportunities to express views and

⁵LRM, Vol. 48, p. 110.

between. The job of these committees is to advise
 with and advise workers before they become active.
 Existing voluntary dispute-resolution machinery
 will be used, where available....
 Existing legal procedures also will continue to
 be used and will be improved. A revision of the
 cooperative system laws (the NLRA and the General
 to not up 'accelerated procedures for dealing with
 workers at Alaska and space also within the Board's
 jurisdiction, in accordance with the law.
 Disputes not disposed of by these procedures
 will be handled by federal panels, composed of com-
 mittee members or others.... The panels will hold
 hearings and may make findings of fact, recommend
 a settlement, get agreement for final and binding
 arbitration, and take some other action as the com-
 mission may order.

Because of its voluntary and persuasive adjustment methods,
 the Alaska Labor Commission is unique. The existing
 labor relations machinery at local levels were established
 for the specific purpose of solving labor problems before
 they develop into serious disputes. These local committees
 utilize the concepts of voluntarism and friendly persuasion
 to the greatest possible extent. These concepts are not unique;
 but the method by which they are employed are unique. In this
 manner, the local committees act as sounding boards for firms
 enable firms and government thereby providing an opportunity
 for discussion of these issues in atmosphere of good will.
 The availability of such opportunities to express views and

opinions regarding working relationships conforms to traditional principles of industrial human relations programs.

As previously noted, the Commission has special subdivisions, or panels, which apply toward solution of special problems. These are comprised of special, individual committees of three general types. First there is the Construction Committee. Panels of this type are concerned with matters related to missile-site construction work. Secondly, there is the Industrial Committee. Industrial panels handle problems with manufacturers of missiles and industrial unions. The third type of Committee has public members dealing with matters not clearly within the jurisdiction of Construction and Industrial committees. When labor problems are not resolved by the local committee, referral is made to the Construction, Industrial, and Public committees, thence to the Commission as necessary. At the Commission level, voluntary methods are attempted again prior to the utilization of directives or orders for dispute settlement. The Commission, in turn, cooperates with other Federal agencies in making its work effective. These include "the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Labor Relations Board, the Department of Labor, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space

systems regarding various techniques common to small-
 sized enterprises of industrial areas (small enterprises).
 In particular cases, the Commission has special studies
 done, or plans, with a view to the solution of special
 problems. These are composed of special, individual committees
 of three general types. First there is the Commission
 Committee. These of this type are concerned with matters
 related to small-scale construction work. Secondly, there
 is the Industrial Committee. Industrial plants have problems
 with manufacture of articles and industrial output. The
 third type of Committee has public matters dealing with matters
 not directly related to the production of goods and
 industrial services. When labor problems are not resolved
 by the local committee, reference is made to the Commission,
 Industrial and Public Relations, which is the Commission
 as necessary. At the Commission level, voluntary action is
 encouraged which aims at the utilization of resources of ex-
 perience and skill. The Commission, in turn, cooper-
 ates with other Federal agencies in making its own studies.
 These studies are Federal studies and Commission studies.
 The National Labor Relations Board, the Department of Labor,
 the Department of Commerce, the National Foundation and State

Administration, and the National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry."⁶

Policies

Two principal policies have been developed by the Missile Sites Labor Commission. The Commission has promulgated these as recommended principles by which negotiators should be guided. These policies pertain to two main areas: Industrial Policy and Construction Policy. They apply specifically as "guides in implementing the economical operations provision of the Executive order."⁷

The Commission's industrial labor policy recommends to parties to labor disputes that agreements applicable to industrial activity at U. S. missile bases follow these guides:

Wage rates, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment should not be negotiated which are inconsistent with standards generally applicable in similar situations . . . or unreasonable under all the circumstances.

In establishing wages, benefits, and working conditions at the sites, recognition should be given to national standards and policies established to cover industrial activity phases at missile sites.

. . . The orderly manning of sites by skilled and trained workmen is a significant factor affecting economical and efficient operations . . . This may require transfer of industrial workers from the home

⁶U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, loc. cit.

⁷Ibid.

Administration, and the National Labor Board for the better
 work of the National Board for the Employment of Women.

Findings

The principal findings have been developed by the

National Labor Commission. The Commission has presented

these as recommended principles by which legislation should

be guided. These principles relate to two main areas: labor

and policy and management policy. They apply specifically

to "guides in implementing the economic operation provision

of the Economic Act."

The Commission's industrial labor policy recommendations to

provide to labor through the economic operation provision to

industrial activity at U. S. State Labor Policy Board:

When wages, hours, benefits, and other conditions

of employment should not be regulated which are the

concern of the workers generally applicable to

all workers . . . or conditions which are

the concern of the workers.

In establishing wages, benefits, and working

conditions at the same, consideration should be given

to national standards and policies established by

the Federal Industrial Relations Board at State level.

. . . The orderly working of time by which

and trained workers is a significant factor in the

economic and social operation . . . that may

provide evidence of industrial workers from the past

U. S. State Labor Commission, Inc. etc.

1944

manufacturing plants to a missile site or from one missile site to another. Procedures and conditions, not inconsistent with standards generally applicable, or not unreasonable under all the circumstances, will be regarded. . . as reasonable.⁸

The Commission has set forth the following guides:

Wage rates, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment should not be negotiated which establish more costly standards on missile and space site construction than are made applicable to other construction activity in similar circumstances.

The introduction of new conditions in an area with sites for any craft should be judged against the standards of practice in the region and construction industry generally. It is recognized that some areas may require somewhat higher wages, benefits, and conditions than have prevailed in the past to attract sufficient manpower into an area to perform the missile and space site work.⁹

The Missile Sites Labor Commission has also promulgated certain recommendations pertaining to the manning of missile-site construction projects that bear policy considerations.

These are as follows:

The Commission urges that the international unions continue to give every possible assistance to requests by contractors to man construction sites particularly in isolated localities.

The Commission urges the Defense Department and NASA to review the present schedules of overtime hours on bases. The differences in scheduled overtime on sites in the same region, at times in the jurisdiction of the same local union or labor

⁸LRRM, Vol. 49, p. 101.

⁹Ibid.

whereas plans to a small size or two
one might like to consider, however, and
conditions, not inconsistent with standards
generally applicable, or not otherwise under
all the circumstances, will be regarded. . .
as reasonable.

The Commission has set forth the following values:

These values, figures, benefits, and other con-
ditions of equipment should not be regarded
which establish more costly standards on which
and upon which construction plans are made appli-
cable to other construction activity in similar
circumstances.

The introduction of new conditions in an
area with effect for any time should be judged
against the standards of practice in the region
and construction industry generally. It is
recognized that some areas may require standards
higher values, benefits, and conditions than have
prevailed in the past to attract sufficient work
power into the area to perform the small and
space work.

The Small Size Labor Commission has also provided
certain recommendations pertaining to the setting of small-
size construction projects that bear policy considerations.
These are as follows:

The Commission urges that the International
Union continue to give every possible assistance
to workers by construction to new construction
sites particularly in isolated localities.
The Commission urges the Federal Government
and State to review the present situation of over-
time hours of workers. The difference in scheduled
overtime or sites in the same region, at times
in the jurisdiction of the same local union or labor

supply area, is a factor making difficult the recruitment of manpower and contributes to high turnover. While uniformity is understandably difficult, sites in the same region should normally be worked the same schedules.¹⁰

What is the significance of the foregoing policy statements? The significance seems to be that these policies constitute procedures, or bases upon which individual labor disputes could be analyzed and adjudicated. These policies, procedures, or foundation for decision-making, whatever they are considered to constitute, do provide definite guidelines for the local labor relations committees at the missile-site construction projects. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, they serve as preventive measures. These policies submit to union and company leadership a clear-cut guide for designing employee work plans. Thus, when Labor and Management have prior knowledge of wage levels, fringe benefits, working conditions, and the basic guides by which each of these is to be determined, then this contributes substantially to chances for labor peace and the presence of good will between employee and employer representatives.

Rulings and Decisions

Three significant rulings or decisions of the Missile Sites Labor Commission occurred soon after the Commission's establishment. The first decision of July 21, 1961, involved

¹⁰Ibid.

supply side, is a factor making difficult the
 treatment of management and employees as high
 consumers. While solidarity is undoubtedly
 difficult, since in the same region should not
 really be worked the same schedules.¹⁰

What is the significance of the foregoing policy
 model? The significance seems to be that these policies
 define procedures, or norms upon which individual labor disputes
 could be analyzed and adjudicated. These policies, procedures,
 or foundation for decision-making, however they are considered
 to constitute, to provide definite guidelines for the local
 labor relations committees at the municipal level
 projects. Furthermore, and perhaps more important, they may
 be preventive measures. These policies submit to union and
 company leadership a clear-cut guide for dealing employees
 with plans. Thus, when labor and management have prior knowledge
 of wage levels, fringe benefits, working conditions, and the
 basic rights by which each of these is to be determined, then
 the contribution substantially to standards for labor peace and
 the presence of good will between employer and employee
 representatives.

Unions and Negotiations

Three significant stages in decisions at the municipal
 level labor relations occurred prior to the Commission's
 establishment. The first decision of July 21, 1961, involved

Operating Engineers versus International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). This case concerned a jurisdictional dispute over the installation of underground cable at Walker Air Force Base, Roswell, New Mexico. The Commission ruled:

Disputed work operations involved in installation of underground cable at missile base are inter-related and should be performed on composite basis, though not necessarily with equal division of men, by members of . . . Operating Engineers and . . . Electrical Workers, in accordance with Commission determination as to which jobs are within jurisdiction of each union.¹¹

The second and third rulings, August 23, 1961, concerned collective bargaining agreements regarding hazard pay and wage rates. The former was in reference to the National Electrical Contractors Association versus IBEW at Vandenberg Air Force Base. The latter concerned wage rates in reference to Associated General Contractors versus International Hod Carriers at Forbes Air Force Base.

Hazard pay ruling--

Contract provision granting electrical workers at missile site premium pay for time spent working at heights under hazardous conditions is reasonable in that it involves no pyramiding of premium pay, and is limited in hours and men to actual exposure to hazard, and is not applicable once hazardous conditions are eliminated.¹²

¹¹Labor Arbitration Reports (Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, 1962), Vol. 36, p. 1285.

¹²Ibid, Vol. 37, p. 1.

Operating Engineers versus International Brotherhood of
 Electrical Workers (IBEW). This case concerned a jurisdictional
 dispute over the installation of underground cables at
 Walker Air Force Base, Roswell, New Mexico. The Commission
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Disputed work operations involved in installation of underground cables at missile base are
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 to Associated General Contractors versus International Brotherhood
 of Carriers at Forbes Air Force Base.

Hazard pay ruling--

Contract provision granting electrical workers
 at missile site premium pay for time spent working
 at heights under hazardous conditions is reasonable
 in that it involves no pyramiding of premium pay,
 and is limited in hours and open to actual exposure
 to hazard, and is not applicable once hazardous conditions
 are eliminated.

Wage rate ruling--

Area collective bargaining contract's provision setting higher wage rates in one of four counties covered by contract, but requiring higher rate in all counties for 'all building work contracted by an agency of the Federal Government', is discriminatory to missile site construction, there being no current problem in manning base in question.¹³

The significance of the three rulings is determined to be as follows: (1) July 21, 1961--This ruling occurred just two months after the Missile Sites Labor Commission was established. The Commission acted quickly in determining the problem and developing means for resolving the dispute. The dispute was held to involve operations that were vital to the missile program. Voluntary procedures between disputants had not solved the problem. The solution recommended by the Commission was adopted. The case served to instill confidence in the ability of the Missile Sites Labor Commission to fulfill its mission. (2) August 23, 1961--the two cases ruled upon this date had two results. First, the hazard pay ruling and its "reasonableness" feature served to underwrite further the fairness and the comprehensive analysis that the Commission was willing to undertake. Secondly, the wage rate ruling and its "discriminatory" feature made it clear to Labor, Management, Government, and the public that

¹³Ibid.

Wage Rate Ceiling

When collective bargaining contracts provide
 section eight wage rates in one of four categories
 covered by contract, but reporting higher rates in all
 categories for 'all building work contracted by an agency
 of the Federal Government', is discriminatory to non-
 also rate construction, there being no current problem
 in meeting base in question.1)

The significance of the three rulings is determined

to be as follows: (1) July 21, 1961--This ruling occurred

just two months after the House Labor Commission

was established. The Commission acted quickly in determining

the problem and developing means for resolving the dispute.

The dispute was said to involve operations that were vital

to the missile program. Voluntary procedures between dis-

putants had not solved the problem. The solution recommended

by the Commission was adopted. The case served to reaffirm

confidence in the ability of the House Labor Commission

to solve the problem. (2) August 23, 1961--The two

cases ruled upon this date had two results. First, the

House's pay ruling and its "essentialness" feature served to

underwrite further the fairness and the comprehensive analysis

that the Commission was willing to undertake. Secondly, the

wage rate ruling and its "discriminatory" feature made it

clear to labor, management, Government, and the public that

the Commission was not hesitant to act firmly and decisively against practices detrimental to the missile program. In this manner, respect was accorded the Missile Sites Labor Commission.

The Record of Labor Disputes Since
Establishment of the Commission

The Missile Sites Labor Commission has provided two authoritative reports on labor disputes at U. S. missile bases for the period June 1961 through May 1962. The first of these constitutes the first annual report of the Commission's activities.¹⁴ The second report goes into greater detail in an analysis of work stoppages occurring in the missile-site construction program during the first year of the Commission.¹⁵ The data for the second report was compiled by the Missile Sites Labor Commission from field reports of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the U. S. Air Force, in addition to the files of the Commission.

In the letter of transmittal forwarding the first annual report to the President, the Secretary of Labor made particular note of the cooperation of Labor, Management, and Government

¹⁴U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, United for America: A Report to the President, May 26, 1962.

¹⁵U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S. Missile Sites June 1961-May 1962, July 1962.

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In the letter of transmittal forwarding the first annual report to the President, the Secretary of Labor made particular note of the cooperation of labor, management, and Government

¹U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, United for America: A Report to the President, May 16, 1962.

²U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, Analysis of Work Stoppages at U. S. Missile Sites June 1961-May 1962, July 1962.

at all levels of missile-site construction activity. It was reported that the Commission was highly successful in decreasing the man-days of labor lost due to labor disputes and in achieving reductions of costs at the missile bases. During the Commission's first year, as detailed by the Secretary of Labor, the lost time experienced was reduced to an "all time low of 1 man-day lost for each 1,100 man-days worked."¹⁶

This 1100 to 1 ratio of man-days worked to man-days lost during the first year of the Missile Sites Labor Commission, May 1961 to June 1962, may be compared to the 96 to 1 ratio of the four previous years, July 1956 to June 1961. This signifies a substantial improvement.

Table 3 shows the record of work stoppages by months on missile bases during the twelve month period between June 1961 and May 1962. There were 160 work stoppages during this period. The mean number per month was 13.3. An inspection of Table 3 reveals that during the two months November 1961 and May 1962, work stoppages were below the mean by a substantial margin; these were 8 and 5, respectively. During September 1961, January 1962, and February 1962, work stoppages were above the mean; namely, 18, 23, and 19. The best record was

¹⁶Letter from Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of Labor and Chairman of the Missile Sites Labor Commission, to the President of the United States, May 26, 1962.

at all levels of missile-rocket construction activity. It was reported that the Commission was highly successful in decreasing the number of labor lost due to labor disputes and in achieving reductions of costs at the missile bases. During the Commission's first year, as detailed by the Secretary of Labor, the lost time experienced was reduced to an "all time low of 1 man-day lost for each 1,100 man-days worked."¹⁶ This 1960 as 1 ratio of man-days worked to man-days lost during the first year of the missile bases Labor Commission, May 1961 to June 1962, may be compared to the 96 to 1 ratio of the two previous years, July 1959 to June 1961. This eliminates a substantial improvement.

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¹⁶Letter from Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of Labor and Chairman of the Missile Bases Labor Commission, to the President of the United States, May 26, 1962.

WORK STOPPAGES BY MONTHS ON MISSILE SITES
JUNE 1961 - MAY 1962^a

Month	Number
June	11
July	11
August	14
September	18
October	13
November	8
December	12
January	23
February	19
March	14
April	12
May	5
Total	160

Mean = 13.3

^aSource: U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission,
Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S.
Missile Sites June 1961-May 1962,
July 1962, p. 13.

achieved during the month of May 1962 when only 5 work stoppages occurred.

Table 4 provides information concerning the duration of work stoppages at missile bases during the period June 1961 to May 1962. It is noted that most of the stoppages were of short duration. Of the 160 stoppages, 119 (74.3 per cent) lasted less than one and one-half days; also, it should be

TABLE 1

WORM RECOVERIES AT LINDEN ON RIVERIA WITTS
JUNE 1961 - MAY 1962

Month	Recovery
June	11
July	11
August	10
September	18
October	15
November	0
December	15
January	21
February	19
March	14
April	11
May	0
Total	160

Mean = 13.3

Source: U. S. Wildlife Survey Report, Washington, D. C.
Analysis of Worm Recoveries on U. S.
Wildlife Survey Report, Washington, D. C.
July 1962, p. 17.

achieved during the month of May 1962 when only 3 worms
recovered occurred.
Table 1 provides information concerning the number of
worms recovered at Linden during the period June 1961
to May 1962. It is noted that most of the worms were of
short duration. Of the 160 worms, 11 (7.5 per cent)
lasted less than one and one-half days; also, it should be

TABLE 4

WORK DAYS LOST DURING WORK STOPPAGES
AT MISSILE SITES
JUNE 1961 - MAY 1962^a

Work Days Lost	Number	Per Cent
.00 - .49	29	18.1
.50 - .99	44	27.5
1.0 - 1.49	46	28.7
1.5 - 1.99	4	2.5
2.0 - 2.49	9	5.6
2.5 - 2.99	8	5.0
3.0 - 3.49	9	5.6
3.5 - 3.99	2	1.3
4.0 - 4.49	2	1.3
4.5 - 4.99	0	0
5.0 + Over	7	4.4
Total	160	100.0

Mean = 1.41

^aSource: U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission,
Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S.
Missile Bases June 1961-May 1962,
July 1962, p. 15.

noted that 73 (45.6 per cent) were less than one day duration.

The Missile Sites Labor Commission has classified missile-site labor disputes under five headings: (1) Grievance; (2) Jurisdictional (Craft vs. Craft); (3) Jurisdictional (Industrial vs. Craft); (4) Union vs Non-Union; and (5) Contract Negotiations. Table 5 shows the types of disputes that occurred June 1961 through May 1962. Grievances constituted

TABLE 2
 MISSILE DAYS LEFT IN STOCK
 AT MISSILE BAY
 JUNE 1961 - MAY 1962

Missile Days Left	Number	Per Cent
1.0 - 1.99	1	1.0
2.0 - 2.99	0	0.0
3.0 - 3.99	2	1.3
4.0 - 4.99	1	0.5
5.0 - 5.99	0	0.0
6.0 - 6.99	0	0.0
7.0 - 7.99	0	0.0
8.0 - 8.99	0	0.0
9.0 - 9.99	0	0.0
10.0 - 10.99	0	0.0
11.0 - 11.99	0	0.0
12.0 - 12.99	0	0.0
13.0 - 13.99	0	0.0
14.0 - 14.99	0	0.0
15.0 - 15.99	0	0.0
16.0 - 16.99	0	0.0
17.0 - 17.99	0	0.0
18.0 - 18.99	0	0.0
19.0 - 19.99	0	0.0
20.0 - 20.99	0	0.0
21.0 - 21.99	0	0.0
22.0 - 22.99	0	0.0
23.0 - 23.99	0	0.0
24.0 - 24.99	0	0.0
25.0 - 25.99	0	0.0
26.0 - 26.99	0	0.0
27.0 - 27.99	0	0.0
28.0 - 28.99	0	0.0
29.0 - 29.99	0	0.0
30.0 - 30.99	0	0.0
31.0 - 31.99	0	0.0
32.0 - 32.99	0	0.0
33.0 - 33.99	0	0.0
34.0 - 34.99	0	0.0
35.0 - 35.99	0	0.0
36.0 - 36.99	0	0.0
37.0 - 37.99	0	0.0
38.0 - 38.99	0	0.0
39.0 - 39.99	0	0.0
40.0 - 40.99	0	0.0
41.0 - 41.99	0	0.0
42.0 - 42.99	0	0.0
43.0 - 43.99	0	0.0
44.0 - 44.99	0	0.0
45.0 - 45.99	0	0.0
46.0 - 46.99	0	0.0
47.0 - 47.99	0	0.0
48.0 - 48.99	0	0.0
49.0 - 49.99	0	0.0
50.0 - 50.99	0	0.0
51.0 - 51.99	0	0.0
52.0 - 52.99	0	0.0
53.0 - 53.99	0	0.0
54.0 - 54.99	0	0.0
55.0 - 55.99	0	0.0
56.0 - 56.99	0	0.0
57.0 - 57.99	0	0.0
58.0 - 58.99	0	0.0
59.0 - 59.99	0	0.0
60.0 - 60.99	0	0.0
61.0 - 61.99	0	0.0
62.0 - 62.99	0	0.0
63.0 - 63.99	0	0.0
64.0 - 64.99	0	0.0
65.0 - 65.99	0	0.0
66.0 - 66.99	0	0.0
67.0 - 67.99	0	0.0
68.0 - 68.99	0	0.0
69.0 - 69.99	0	0.0
70.0 - 70.99	0	0.0
71.0 - 71.99	0	0.0
72.0 - 72.99	0	0.0
73.0 - 73.99	0	0.0
74.0 - 74.99	0	0.0
75.0 - 75.99	0	0.0
76.0 - 76.99	0	0.0
77.0 - 77.99	0	0.0
78.0 - 78.99	0	0.0
79.0 - 79.99	0	0.0
80.0 - 80.99	0	0.0
81.0 - 81.99	0	0.0
82.0 - 82.99	0	0.0
83.0 - 83.99	0	0.0
84.0 - 84.99	0	0.0
85.0 - 85.99	0	0.0
86.0 - 86.99	0	0.0
87.0 - 87.99	0	0.0
88.0 - 88.99	0	0.0
89.0 - 89.99	0	0.0
90.0 - 90.99	0	0.0
91.0 - 91.99	0	0.0
92.0 - 92.99	0	0.0
93.0 - 93.99	0	0.0
94.0 - 94.99	0	0.0
95.0 - 95.99	0	0.0
96.0 - 96.99	0	0.0
97.0 - 97.99	0	0.0
98.0 - 98.99	0	0.0
99.0 - 99.99	0	0.0
100.0 - 100.99	0	0.0

Mean = 1.41

Source: U. S. Missile Days Left Commission,
Analysis of Days Left in Stock,
 Missile Days Left June 1961-May 1962,
 July 1962, p. 13.

noted that 73 (43.0 per cent) were less than one day duration.
 The Missile Days Left Commission has classified missiles
 also into three order live headings: (1) Extension;
 (2) Indefinite (Curtis vs. Grant); (3) Indefinite;
 (Indefinite vs. Grant); (4) Union vs. Non-Union; and (5) Indefinite.
 Table 2 shows the types of missiles that
 occurred from 1961 through May 1962. Missiles occurred

TABLE 5

INCIDENCE OF WORK STOPPAGES AND MAN-DAYS LOST
AT MISSILE SITES ACCORDING TO TYPE OF DISPUTE
JUNE 1961 - MAY 1962^a

Type of Dispute	Work Stoppages	Per Cent	Man-Days Lost	Per Cent
Grievance	78	48.8	5,085	32.8
Jurisdictional (Craft vs. Craft)	42	26.3	6,011	38.7
Jurisdictional (Industrial vs. Craft)	18	11.2	1,576	10.2
Union vs. Non-Union	18	11.2	2,666	17.2
Contract Negotiations	4	2.5	171	1.1
Totals	160	100.0	15,505	100.0

^aSource: U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S. Missile Bases June 1961-May 1962, July 1962, p. 20.

the most numerous type of disputes, being the primary issue in 78 (48.8 per cent) of the 160 work stoppages. Grievances account for 32.8 per cent of the total man-days lost.

The combined types of jurisdictional disputes were primary issues in 37.5 per cent of the 160 work stoppages, and accounted for 48.9 per cent of the total man-days lost.

TABLE 2

INCIDENTS OF WORK STOPPAGES AND MAN-DAYS LOST
AT MILLS SITES ACCORDING TO TYPE OF DISPUTE
JUNE 1951 - MAY 1952

Type of Dispute	Work stoppages	Per Cent	Man-Days Lost	Per Cent
Grievances	75	48.8	2,082	21.8
Jurisdictional (Gral vs. Gral)	42	26.2	4,011	28.7
Jurisdictional (Industrial vs. Gral)	13	11.2	1,276	10.2
Union vs. Non-Union	18	11.2	2,688	17.2
Contract Negotiations	4	2.5	171	1.1
Totals	160	100.0	12,207	100.0

Source: U. S. Mine Safety and Health Commission, Analysis of
Work Stoppages at U. S. Mine Sites June 1951-
May 1952, July 1952, p. 19.

The most numerous type of disputes, being the primary reason
in 75 (48.8 per cent) of the 160 work stoppages. Grievances
account for 21.8 per cent of the total man-days lost.
The combined types of jurisdictional disputes were pri-
mary reason in 37.9 per cent of the 160 work stoppages, and
accounted for 48.9 per cent of the total man-days lost.

Union vs. non-union disputes resulted mainly from efforts of unions at missile bases to organize non-union workers. This type dispute caused 11.2 per cent of the work stoppages and 17.2 per cent of the total man-days lost.

Contract negotiations constitute only a small per cent of work stoppages and man-days lost; namely 2.5 per cent and 1.1 per cent, respectively.

Factual background on the types of grievances that occurred provides a better basis for understanding the abuses that have previously been charged as occurring in the missile-site construction program. Table 6 shows the incidence of work stoppages and man-days lost during June 1961-May 1962 by the type of grievance. These figures denote improvement over the previous four year period. It is unfortunate that figures have not been available for this study in order to make a comparison of grievances before and after the establishment of the Missile Sites Commission. However, Table 6 shows that economic demands were involved in 42.4 per cent of the grievances. This includes demands for overtime, wage rate, travel pay or other pay disputes, and demands for reduced workweeks. These type grievances were responsible for 51.2 per cent of the man-days lost due to grievances.

Union vs. non-union disputes resulted mainly from efforts

of unions to obtain better wages and working conditions.

This type dispute caused 11.1 per cent of the work stoppages

and 11.1 per cent of the total man-days lost.

Contract negotiations constituted only a small per cent

of work stoppages and man-days lost; namely 3.3 per cent and

1.1 per cent, respectively.

Technical background on the types of grievances that occur

and present a better basis for understanding the disputes that

have previously been changed as occurring in the classification

classification system. Table 6 shows the incidence of work

stoppages and man-days lost during June 1961-May 1962 by the

types of grievances. These figures demonstrate improvement over the

previous four year period. It is unfortunate that figures have

not been available for this study in order to make a comparison

of grievance volume and other the establishment of the

National Labor Relations Board. However, Table 6 shows that demands

demands were involved in 61.6 per cent of the grievances.

This includes demands for overtime, wage rate, benefit pay or

other pay disputes, and demands for reduced workweek. These

type grievances were responsible for 21.1 per cent of the man-

days lost due to grievances.

TABLE 6

INCIDENCE OF WORK STOPPAGES AND MAN-DAYS LOST
AT MISSILE SITES BY TYPE OF GRIEVANCE
JUNE 1961 - MAY 1962^a

Type of Grievance	Work Stoppages	Per Cent	Man-Days Lost	Per Cent
Demand for Overtime	13	16.7	493	9.7
Wage Rate, Travel Pay or Other Pay Dispute	14	18.0	1,987	39.1
Reduction in Workweek	6	7.7	123	2.4
Discharge of Fellow Employee, Shop Steward or Supervisor	17	21.8	1,314	25.9
Poor Ventilation, Inadequate Heat and/or Food, Lack of Icewater, or other Working Conditions	9	11.5	380	7.5
Lack of Craft Foreman, Union Steward or Craft Worker on a Job	5	6.4	374	7.4
Demand for Better Safety	4	5.1	277	5.4
Protest of Lay-Off	3	3.8	40	.8
Resistance to Transfer	2	2.6	8	.1
Refusal to Work for and Take Orders from a Supervisor or "Too Much Supervision"	3	3.8	21	.4
Disagreement <u>within</u> a Craft over Work Assignments	1	1.3	24	.5
Protest not being Allowed to Conduct Union Business on Company Time	1	1.3	40	.8
Totals	78	100.0	5,081	100.0

^a Source: U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S. Missile Bases June 1961-May 1962, July 1962, p. 21.

TABLE 2

INDUSTRY OF WORK STOPPAGE AND NON-PAID LOST
 AS INDICATED BY TYPE OF CAUSATION
 JUNE 1961 - MAY 1962

Type of Causation	1961-1962 No. of Days	1961-1962 No. of Days	1961-1962 No. of Days	1961-1962 No. of Days
General Ind. Causation	13	10.1	403	8.1
Wage Issue, Travel Pay or Other Pay Dispute	14	10.4	1,981	10.1
Reduction in Workweek	5	7.7	173	2.9
Disruption of Labor Supplies, Shop Closures or Supervision	17	11.0	1,518	23.9
From Unemployment, Inadequate Plant and/or Tools, Lack of Materials, or Labor Hoarding Commitment	8	11.3	240	7.3
Lack of Labor Resources, Labor Unrest or Labor Boycott on a Job	3	0.6	374	7.4
General Ind. Labor Supply	4	3.1	577	2.4
Disruption of Job-Unit	3	2.8	40	.8
Reduction in Workweek	2	2.6	8	.1
Refusal to Work for and Lack Orders from a Supervisor or "Job Shop Supervision"	3	2.8	11	.4
Displacement of Labor or Craft over Own Assignments	1	1.3	24	.1
Transfer not being Allowed to Company Unit Workers on Company Line	1	1.3	40	.8
Totals	78	100.0	2,981	100.0

Source: U. S. National Labor Relations Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Labor Disputes and Work Stoppages, 1961-1962."

A limited amount of data reflecting current missile-site labor dispute statistics has been made available directly to the author of this study by the Missile Sites Labor Commission.¹⁷ This data is set forth in Chart No. 2 and Chart No. 3.

Chart No. 2 is a graph of the ratio of man-days lost to man-days worked at missile based from July 1956 to June 1963. The most striking feature of this graph is the abrupt decline in the man-days lost to man-days worked ratio immediately following the establishment of the Missile Sites Labor Commission. The explanation of this graph is as follows: during the period July 1956 through May 1960, the ratio of man-days lost due to labor disputes, expressed as a percentage of the total man-days worked, totaled 1.78 per cent. From June 1960 through May 1961, man-days lost totaled .593 per cent of man-days worked. From June 1961, just after the Missile Sites Labor Commission was established, through May 1962, man-days lost were .091 per cent of man-days worked. The decreasing trend in these percentages continued during the second year of the Commission, June 1962 through May 1963, when the ratio of man-days lost expressed a percentage of the man-days worked totaled .077 per cent.

Chart No. 3 provides an analysis of missile-site labor statistics through May 1963, in comparison with data compiled

¹⁷Data provided by Mr. Richard P. Chambers, Labor Relations Analyst, Missile Sites Labor Commission, as a result of a telephone interview with the author on July 11, 1963.


A limited amount of data reflecting current misclassification labor disputes resolution has been made available directly to the author of this study by the Illinois State Labor Council. This data is set forth in Chart No. 1 and Chart No. 2.

Chart No. 1 is a graph of the ratio of non-days lost to non-days worked at Illinois based from July 1950 to June 1961. The most striking feature of this graph is the sharp decline in the non-days lost to non-days worked ratio immediately following the establishment of the Illinois State Labor Council. The explanation of this graph is as follows: During the period July 1950 through May 1960, the ratio of non-days lost to non-days worked, expressed as a percentage of the total to labor disputes, averaged 1.75 per cent. From June 1960 through May 1961, non-days lost averaged .593 per cent of non-days worked. From June 1961, just after the Illinois State Labor Council was established, through May 1961, non-days lost were .031 per cent of non-days worked. The decreasing trend in these percentages continued during the second year of the Commission, June 1961 through May 1962, when the ratio of non-days lost averaged a percentage of the non-days worked equalled .077 per cent.

Chart No. 2 provides an analysis of misclassification labor disputes through May 1962, in comparison with data compiled

¹Data provided by Mr. Richard F. Campbell, Labor Relations Manager, Illinois State Labor Council, as a result of a release agreement with the author on May 11, 1962.

RATIO OF MAN-DAYS LOST TO MAN-DAYS WORKED
AT MISSILE SITES - JULY 1956 TO JUNE 1963




Source: Mr. Richard P. Chambers,
Labor Relations Analyst, Missile Sites Labor Commission

COMPARATIVE LOST TIME DUE TO LABOR DISPUTES -

MISSILE SITES, CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES,

AND ALL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES



M/D W	17,781,000	16,969,900	13,721,000	-	-
M/D L	185,478	15,505	10,653	4,160,000	19,000,000
% L/W	1.04	.091	.077	.60	.16

Ratio W/L 96 to 1 1100 to 1 1289 to 1 167 to 1 625 to 1

Source: Mr. Richard P. Chambers, Labor Relations Analyst,
Missile Sites Labor Commission.

by the Missile Sites Labor Commission from Bureau of Labor Statistics sources on contract construction and all U. S. industry during 1962. There is a considerable difference in the man-days lost and man-days worked situation between the time prior to the establishment of the Missile Sites Labor Commission, and afterwards.

Summary

This chapter has focused attention on the organization and activities of the Missile Sites Labor Commission, and through a presentation of statistical data, has clarified the substantial improvement in labor relations at U. S. missile bases since May 1961.

The Missile Sites Labor Commission was established by the President of the United States through the issuance of Executive Order No. 10946 on May 26, 1961. During the four year period prior to that date, work stoppages, work slowdowns, and other problems due to labor disputes in the missile-site construction program had evidenced a potential for seriously affecting the security of the United States. The matter became of sufficient concern by the Fall of 1960 to warrant congressional investigation. Throughout the Winter of 1960-1961, investigations of missile-site labor problems were in progress by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

by the House Select Committee on Labor and Human Resources. The Committee's report, "The National Labor Relations Board: A Study of Its Organization and Operations," was published in 1961. There is a considerable difference in the number of cases and the number of cases decided between the time prior to the establishment of the House Select Committee, and afterwards.

Summary

This chapter has focused attention on the organization and activities of the House Select Committee, and through a presentation of statistical data, has clarified the substantial improvement in labor relations in U. S. business since May 1961.

The House Select Committee was established by the President of the United States through the issuance of Executive Order No. 11644 on May 17, 1961. During the last year period prior to that date, work stoppages, work slowdowns, and other problems due to labor disputes in the business and construction groups had witnessed a potential for seriously affecting the security of the United States. The entire picture of business relations by the fall of 1960 in various organizations of business, industry, and commerce of 1960-1961, in-
by the House Select Committee on Labor and Human Resources

of the Committee on Government Operations (descendant of the Old Labor Rackets Committee). During this time, a new Administration was being formed.

Shortly after President Kennedy took office in January, 1961, he issued Executive Order No. 10918 which established the President's Advisory Committee on Labor Management Policy. This Committee is tripartite in form; its membership is composed of Labor, Management, and public representatives under the auspices of the Federal Government--the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Commerce each alternately serve as Chairman of the Committee. The function of the Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy is to study, advise, and recommend to the President certain policies that may be followed by Labor, Management, and Government in order that industrial peace and the institution of collective bargaining may be preserved. The establishment of this Committee evidenced a concern of the Federal Government over the responsibilities and actions of unions and employers, and the far-reaching societal effects that labor-management decisions have in the American industrial economy. It is clear that these effects may include potentially serious harm to national security. This occurs when Labor and Management fail to reach accord in missile-site labor dispute matters. A single dispute, in itself,

of the Committee on Government Operations (descendant of the
Old Labor Relations Committee). During this time, a new
administration was being formed.

Shortly after President Truman took office in January,
1961, he issued Executive Order No. 10450 which established
the President's Advisory Committee on Labor Management Policy.

This Committee is expected to have its membership in composed
of labor, management, and public representatives under the
auspices of the Federal Government--the Secretary of Labor and

the Secretary of Commerce will alternately serve as Chairman
of the Committee. The function of the Advisory Committee on
Labor-Management Policy is to study, advise, and recommend

to the President various policies that may be relevant to
labor, management, and Government in order that industrial
peace and the institution of relations containing may be

preserved. The establishment of this Committee evidenced a
concern of the Federal Government over the responsibilities
and status of unions and employers, and the inter-union

industrial relations that labor-management relations have in the
American industrial economy. It is clear that these subjects
may include potentially serious areas in national security.

This concern about labor and management fall to reach sound in
industrial labor dispute matters. A single dispute, in itself,

may not constitute potential harm to national security; however, the combination of many disputes may. Such combination did occur in missile-site construction activity. The Federal Government then considered its responsibility for protecting and preserving the general public interest, and as a result, the Missile Sites Labor Commission was created for the purpose of combating the menace of labor problems to national security.

It is a fact that a great deal of improvement in labor troubles at the missile bases has been achieved through the organization, adjustment methods, policies, and actions of the Missile Sites Labor Commission.

It is highly significant that this Commission has achieved such a laudatory record of improved labor relations at U. S. missile bases. When these accomplishments are considered in view of the issue surrounding Federal Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes, it becomes enigmatic that the exploration for possible forms and further design of solutions to labor problems in other areas of the U. S. industrial economy should not result in adaptation of certain inherent features of the Missile Sites Labor Commission.

In the conclusion that follows, the usefulness of tripartite action as exemplified by labor relations experiences in the

any not constitute political power or national security; however, the Commission of many disputes may. Such commission did occur in similar circumstances activity. The Federal Government must also consider the responsibility for protecting and preserving the general public interest, and as a result, the National Labor Relations Board was created for the purpose of conducting the process of labor problems to national security. It is a fact that a great deal of experience in labor troubles as the NLRB has been achieved through the organization, adjustment, methods, policies, and actions of the NLRB since its creation.

It is highly significant that this Commission has achieved such a satisfactory record of improved labor relations as the NLRB does. With these accomplishments and similar in view of the same surrounding Federal Government interest as a third-party to labor disputes, it becomes self-evident that the explanation for possible losses and losses of relations to labor problems in most cases of the U. S. industrial process should not result in satisfaction of certain Federal Government of the NLRB since Labor Commission. In the Commission that follows, the relationship of industrial relations as exemplified by labor relations experienced in the

U. S. missile-site construction program will be made applicable to other industrial relations bearing directly on national security.

U. S. assistance construction program will be made available to other educational institutions located directly or indirectly

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 17

CONCLUSION

This study has examined the problem of labor disputes at U. S. missile bases in reference to the issue of Federal Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes. Specific attention has been directed to the record of labor problems affecting national security during World War I and World War II. These wartime labor experiences demonstrate the need for direct governmental participation in labor-management relations when national security is threatened. This particular role of Government is generally acceptable to the American public and is also generally acceptable to Labor and Management. In wartime, the fact that national security depends upon the contribution of labor services to industrial production, providing materials and services for war, is readily understood by the public and by individuals from the Labor and Management areas of society. The Federal Government is expected to take definite action in settling wartime labor disputes in order to meet the clear responsibility that it bears for protecting the safety of the United States.

However, in times of peace, the role of Government in labor relations is less definite than during wartime. A lack of clear and imminent danger, or a general feeling of such on the part of the public, results in a lesser degree of participation by Government being acceptable to Labor and Management.

This study has examined the position of labor disputes in U. S. labor law in relation to the issue of Federal Government intervention as a third-party in labor disputes. Specific attention has been directed to the record of labor problems affecting national security during World War I and World War II. These wartime labor experiences demonstrate the need for direct governmental participation in labor-management relations when national security is concerned. This particular role of Government is generally acceptable to the American public and is also generally acceptable to labor and management. In wartime, the labor-management security depends upon the contribution of labor services to industrial production, providing materials and services for war, is readily understood by the public and by individuals from the labor and management areas of society. The Federal Government is expected to take definite action in settling wartime labor disputes in order to meet the clear responsibility that it bears for protecting the safety of the United States.

However, in times of peace, the role of Government in labor relations is less definite than during wartime. A lack of clear and imminent danger, or a general feeling of peace on the part of the public, results in a lesser degree of participation by Government being acceptable to labor and management.

Representatives of Labor and Management would stress, in peacetime, the rights of each as individual members of a free enterprise society, in arriving at decisions bearing economic import on the basis of their own self-interests. Thus, labor troubles occur when Labor and Management disagree on issues regarding their various forms of working relationships. In the industrial economy that identifies the material basis of societal relationships in the U.S. today, the respective actions of Labor and Management must reflect consideration for public interests as well as individual ones. This is so because of the effect that their decisions may have throughout the economy. For example, decisions of Management in recent years to achieve more efficient and profitable industrial production by automated processes have had to be judged in reference to the beneficial as compared to the harmful effects upon society. In some instances, automation has resulted in unemployment in the labor force; however, the benefits gained through improved technology, and the promise of technology in contributing to future public interests, outweigh the immediate effects of unemployment due to automation. This illustrates how Management decisions affect inter-related areas of society.

Representatives of Labor and Management would agree, in
 practice, the right of each as individual members of a team
 enterprise society, is arriving at decisions bearing economic
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 chooses how to work, labor and management disagree on issues
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 In some industrial situations the need for unemployment is
 the labor force; however, the scientific method through improved
 technology, and the growth of technology is contributing to
 future public interests, even if the technology allows of
 unemployment due to automation. This illustrates how management
 decisions affect interest-related goals of society.

The same is true for Labor decisions. It is an established concept of American democracy that Labor is entitled to rights and privileges in organizing unions and pursuing courses of action designed to benefit the interests of union members. However, these union practices cannot be unbridled. The public interest must take precedent as the determinable factor in these labor relations activities. Therefore, strikes and work stoppages which clearly show potentially serious effect on the security of the nation cannot be permitted to continue. For these reasons, the Congress has provided laws through which the Federal Government may intervene in the event that emergency disputes affect the health and safety of the nation. In the system of checks and balances that denotes the philosophy of American democracy, the Government must be responsible for preserving the interests of Labor and Management, but to a higher degree it is responsible for the public interests. This is especially important when national security depends upon the cooperative efforts of Labor and Management.

The cooperative efforts of Labor and Management are especially important in the U. S. missile base construction program. Missile base construction is necessary in order that operational utilization of ballistic missiles may be attained.

The same is true for labor decisions. It is an established course of action designed to benefit the interests of union members. However, these union decisions cannot be unbridled. The public interest must take precedence as the controlling factor in these labor relations activities. Therefore, whether red work recognizes which class is potentially involved in effect on the activity of the nation cannot be permitted to continue. For these reasons, the Congress has provided laws through which the Federal Government may intervene in the event that emergency disputes affect the health and safety of the nation. In the system of checks and balances that governs the philosophy of American democracy, the Government must be responsible for preserving the interests of labor and management, but to a higher degree it is responsible for the public interest. This is especially important when national safety depends upon the cooperative efforts of labor and management. The cooperative efforts of labor and management are especially important in the U. S. steel basic conversion program. Steel basic conversion is necessary in order to meet operational utilization of ballistic missiles may be achieved.

When this capability is achieved, American society benefits from the protection afforded by the missiles as strategic and tactical weapons of war. Without these weapons, national security would be impaired. Without the cooperation of Labor and Management in missile-site construction, missiles cannot be utilized. This signifies the responsibility that Labor and Management bear together in attending to the general public welfare in their missile-site labor relations.

The issue regarding Federal Government intervention as a third-party to labor disputes is largely one of disagreement among parties to disputes as to the form that Government participation should take, and the degree to which governmental action should be applied.

The record of labor disputes at U. S. missile bases, when viewed with respect to the governmental actions by which the effects of these disputes have been dissipated, illustrates the vital necessity of extensive tripartite action.

The Missile Sites Labor Commission is an example of how the dilemma of public versus private interests in labor controversies can be satisfactorily ameliorated through tripartite adjudication. This Commission is relatively new, having served in the public interest for only twenty seven months at the time of this writing. It is concluded, on the basis of the

When this responsibility is assigned, American society benefits from the protection afforded by the nation's resources and material resources of war. Without these weapons, national security would be jeopardized. Without the cooperation of labor and management in mass-for-arms construction, national security would be jeopardized. This illustrates the responsibility that labor and management bear together in relation to the national public welfare in their inter-related labor relations.

The issue regarding Federal Government intervention as a third-party in labor disputes is largely one of disagreement among parties to disputes as to the fact that Government participation should be, and the degree to which Governmental action should be applied.

The record of labor disputes at U. S. plants shows, when viewed from respect to the Governmental action by which the effects of these disputes have been dissipated; illustrates the vital necessity of extensive Government action.

The National Labor Relations Commission is an example of how the division of public versus private interests in labor relations can be satisfactorily mediated through legislative action. This Commission is relatively new, having passed in the public interest for only twenty years now as the time of this writing. It is concluded, on the basis of the

analysis contained in this study, that this type of tripartite action evidences the form and degree of Government intervention that should be applied in other areas of industrial relations when labor disputes threaten the national security.

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